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EDWARD M. HARRIS
Major Events in the Recent Past in Assembly Speeches
and the Authenticity of [Andocides] On the Peace
When a speaker (rhetor) addressed the Athenian Assembly, he had to be very 
careful not to misrepresent major events in the recent past if he were to main-
tain his credibility. In a speech delivered in court, a litigant might accuse his 
opponent of crimes without a shred of evidence. A different standard was how-
ever observed in the Assembly. Speakers often used examples (paradeigmata) 
from the past to support their arguments about what the Athenians should 
do in the future. For their arguments to convince, these examples had to be 
familiar to the voters in the Assembly and to be accurate. A speaker could not 
lie about major political events everyone had witnessed. If a politician wanted 
the Assembly to enact his proposals, he could not state that the Athenians 
won the battles of Aegospotamoi and Chaeronea or that the Spartans won the 
battle of Leuctra or refer to treaties that never existed. A speaker might make 
minor involuntary errors about insignificant aspects of historical events but 
could not misrepresent the causes of a recent war nor make errors about con-
temporary institutions. 
This essay will start by reviewing the statements made by Demosthenes 
about major recent events in his speeches to the Assembly and show that they 
are accurate and confirmed by other sources. These statements also tend to 
be brief and to the point. Speakers in the Assembly did not have the time to 
provide lengthy narratives about past history but alluded briefly to familiar 
events.1 The rest of the essay will show that the speech On the Peace attributed 
to Andocides makes major mistakes about contemporary and recent events 
and uses the term presbeis autokratores in a way that reveals the author of this 
work was not familiar with the institution. All this evidence confirms the 
judgement of Dionysius of Halicarnassus that the speech is not a genuine work 
of Andocides and the doubts of Harpocration about its authenticity.2 
1. On the expression “you all know”, see Pearson 1941 and Canevaro 2019. 
2. Earlier scholars have accepted the authenticity of On the Peace as a genuine 
work of Andocides. See, for example, Hamilton 1979, 234-237, Edwards 1995, 107-108, 
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1. Major recent events in Demosthenes’ public speeches
The Demosthenic corpus contains sixteen speeches written for delivery be-
fore the Athenian Assembly, but the authenticity of three has been questioned 
(11, 13, 17), and one (7) is attributed to Hegesippus by most scholars.3 The his-
torical allusions will be examined in the order the speeches were delivered. 
“Recent events” are those occurring thirty to forty years before the speech. 
The speech On the Symmories (14), delivered in 354/3, contains few allusions 
to contemporary events, but they are all confirmed by other sources. Dem-
osthenes (14.13) says that the Athenians have about three hundred triremes 
available, which is close to the figure found in the naval records for the year 
353/2 (IG II2 1613, ll. 284-292).4 Demosthenes (14.19, 27) states that the taxable 
property available for the eisphora is 6,000 talents, which is close to the figure 
given for the year 378/7 by Polybius (2.62.6-7). Demosthenes also alludes to 
revolts by Orontes and the Egyptians, which are attested in other sources.5 
And the information Demosthenes gives about naval equipment is consistent 
with the epigraphic evidence.6
MacDowell in Gagarin, MacDowell 1998, 148-158 and Grethlein 2010, 128 n. 9. My argu-
ments against authenticity in Harris 2000 have been accepted by Martin 2009, 220 n. 4, 
Couvenhes 2012, 109-114, Conwell 2008, 220, Zaccarini 2017, 34 n. 46 (“probably a gross 
forgery”), and Canevaro 2019, 140. Rhodes 2016 replies to my arguments, but, as we will 
see, he misrepresents the ancient evidence and makes serious errors. Magnetto 2013 
only discusses my analysis of the term presbeis autokratores, but her objections contain 
several errors. See the discussion of this term later in this essay. This essay adds more 
evidence to the evidence presented in Harris 2000 and modifies some of the analyses 
in that essay. 
3. On the authenticity of Dem. 11, see MacDowell 2009, 360-363. Trevett 1994 argues 
that Dem. 13 is genuine, but the speech is omitted from the list of speeches in the Letter 
to Ammaeus by Dionysius of Halicarnassus; see also Sing 2017, who argues against au-
thenticity. On the authenticity of Dem. 17, see Trevett 2011, 287 and MacDowell 2009, 
380-381; Culasso Gastaldi 1984 believes that it was written by Demosthenes’ neph-
ew Demochares; Hitching 2017 discusses only the date. One major piece of evidence 
against authenticity is the absence of any stichometry for the speech. 
4. See Gabrielsen 1994, 126-129. 
5. For these revolts, see Briant 2002, 662-666, 682-685.
6. See Gabrielsen 1994, 146-169 with IG II2
 
1604-1632. 
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The speech On the Megalopolitans (16) was delivered in 353/2 (Dion. Hal. Amm. 
4) and concerns mainly events in the Peloponnese. The statements of Dem-
osthenes accurately portray the situation there and elsewhere. Demosthenes 
(16.4, 25, 28) says that the Thebans have not allowed the cities of Orchomenus, 
Thespiai, and Plataea to be resettled, which is consistent with other informa-
tion about their status at the time (Diod. Sic. 15.46.6; 79.3-6; Paus. 9.1.4-8). Dem-
osthenes (16.6) is also correct in recalling that the Athenians fought with the 
Spartans against the Thebans at the battle of Mantinea (Xen. Hell. 7.5.15-18; 
Diod. Sic. 15.84.4-87.6). The alliance between Athens and Messene mentioned 
by Demosthenes (16.6) is confirmed by Pausanias (4.28.2). Demosthenes (16.16) 
implies that Elis had lost Triphylia and alludes to a dispute over Tricaranum, 
which are also recounted by Xenophon (Hell. 7.1.26; 4.4). Demosthenes (11-13, 
18) also mentions Theban control over Oropus, which is confirmed by several 
other sources (Xen. Hell. 7.4.1; Aeschin. 3.85; Diod. Sic. 15.76.1; Plut. Dem. 5). 
The First Philippic (4) is dated by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Amm. 4) to 
352/1 and discusses the situation in Northern and Central Greece. Demosthe-
nes (4.4-6) gives accurate information about the loss of Pydna, Potidaea, and 
Methone (see below) and about Athenian expeditions to Euboea, Haliartus and 
Thermopylae (Dem. 4.17 with Aeschin. 3.85; Diod. Sic. 16.7.2; IG II2 124 [Eu-
boea]; Xen. Hell. 3.5.18-19 [Haliartus]; Diod. Sic. 16.38.1 [Thermopylae]). He is 
also correct about the Athenian defeat of the Spartans at Corinth in 393 (Xen. 
Hell. 4.4.15; Diod. Sic. 14.91.2-3). Demosthenes (4.27) gives accurate informa-
tion about the hipparch at Lemnos ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 61.6) and about Thasos 
and Skiathos as Athenian allies (IG II2 43, lines A86, B3).7 His criticism of the 
Athenians for trying generals two or three times on different capital charges 
is slightly exaggerated but has a large element of truth (Dem. 4.47).8
The speech On the Freedom of the Rhodians (15), delivered in 351/0, contains 
several allusions to recent events. Demosthenes (15.3-4) alludes to the recent 
revolt from the Second Athenian Confederacy by Chios, Byzantium and Rhodes, 
which is confirmed by Diodorus (15.7.3). Demosthenes (5.9-10) also mentions 
the orders given to Timotheus about aid to the satrap Ariobarzanes and the 
conquest of Samos, which is confirmed by other sources (Ariobarzanes: Diod. 
7. On Thasos, see also Dem. 20.59 with Canevaro 2016, 291-292 with references to 
earlier discussions.
8. For trials of generals, see Hansen 1975, 63-64. 
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Sic. 15.90-92; Samos: Isocr. 15.11).9 The information Demosthenes (15.19) gives 
about oligarchs at Mytilene is confirmed in part by the eighth letter of Isoc-
rates to the leaders there. Demosthenes (15.22, 24) also alludes to two earlier 
events. First, he mentions that, during the Thirty, several Athenian exiles went 
to Argos (Diod. Sic. 14.6.2). Second, he mentions the unsuccessful attempt of 
Cyrus and Clearchus to overthrow the Persian king in 401, which is recounted 
at length in Xenophon’s Anabasis (1.1-10.19). Finally, Demosthenes (15.27, 29) 
alludes to the King’s Peace, which was concluded in 387/6 (Diod. Sic. 14.110.2-
4; Xen. Hell. 5.1. 31; see below for detailed discussion) and was still in effect. 
The three speeches about Olynthus (1-3) were delivered in 349/8 (Dion. 
Hal. Amm. 4; Philochorus FGrHist 328 F 49-51) and also concern the situation in 
Northern Greece.10 Demosthenes repeatedly mentions the cities captured in 
this area, defeats that are confirmed by other sources: Amphipolis (Dem. 1.5; 
12; 2.6 with Diod. Sic. 16.6.2), Potidaea (Dem. 1.9; 2.7 with Diod. Sic. 16.8.5), Py-
dna (Dem. 1.5, 12 with Diod. Sic. 16.82.2-3), and Methone (Dem. 1.9 with Diod. 
Sic. 16.31.6; 34.4-5).11 There is not as much evidence in the sources about Thes-
saly in this period (Diod. Sic. 16.38.1), but Demosthenes’ statements are not in-
consistent with what is known about Philip’s influence there (Dem. 1.13, 21-22; 
2.11).12 Demosthenes states that the Phocians desperately needed help, which 
is in line with information supplied by Diodorus (16.37.3-38.2). The allusions 
of Demosthenes (1.13) to campaigns of Philip against Illyrians, Paeonians and 
Arybbas are confirmed by inscriptions (IG II2 127; IG II3 1, 411).13 The statement 
of Demosthenes (2.14) about Timotheus’s campaigns against Olynthus is also 
confirmed (Nepos Timotheus 1.2; Polyaenus Strat. 3.10.7, 14; IG II2 110 [363/2]).
9. For discussion of Demosthenes’ account of Timotheus’ actions, see Canevaro 
2019, 154-155. 
10. On these speeches, see Herrman 2019. 
11. The accounts of the siege and abandonment of Methone are also confirmed by 
archaeological evidence; see Bessios, Athanassiadou, Noulas 2021. 
12. Rhodes, Osborne 2003, 225 and Worthington 2008, 64-66 mistakenly believe that 
Philip was archon of Thessaly at this time. See Harris 1995, 175-176; Dmitriev 2011, 411-
420; Helly 2018, 139-150. 
13. Errington 1975 and Heskel 1988 plausibly place the campaign against Arybbas 
around 350; Griffith 1979, 504-509, followed by Rhodes, Osborne 2003, 353-355, place 
the campaign in 342, which is less likely. 
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On the Peace (5) was delivered in late 346 after the conclusion of the Peace 
of Philocrates (Dion. Hal. Amm. 4). At the beginning of his speech Demosthenes 
(5.5) alludes to the recent defeat of the Athenians on Euboea, which is recount-
ed by Plutarch (Phocion 12-14) and mentioned in Against Meidias (Dem. 21.110). 
His statement that Argos, Messene and Megalopolis are hostile to Sparta (Dem. 
5.18) is accurate as we saw in the speech On the Megalopolitans. His statements 
that the Phocians had seized Orchomenos and Coroneia during the Third Sa-
cred War and that the Thebans recovered them in 346 are certainly true (Dem. 
5.20; Diod. Sic. 16.56.2), and the statement that the Thebans controlled Oropus 
at the time is also true as we saw above (Dem. 5.10, 16). Aeschines (2.119-20) 
corroborates the predictions made about Philip’s intentions earlier that year 
(Dem. 5.10)
The Second Philippic (6) was delivered in 344/3 (Dion. Hal. Amm. 4) and men-
tions several of the incidents discussed in earlier speeches regarding Amphi-
polis, Potidaea, and Olynthus (Dem. 6.17) and Philip’s control of Thermopylae 
and the Phocians (Dem. 6.29, 35, 36).
The Third Philippic (9) was delivered in 342/1 and contains many allusions 
to recent events. Demosthenes repeats many of his accusations about the 
events of 346, such as Philip’s seizure of towns in Thrace during the peace 
(9.15) and the “destruction of the Phocians” (9.19, 26, 68).14 The first is mislead-
ing because Philip did capture these towns but not during the peace,15 and the 
second an exaggeration because Philip only imposed a settlement that weak-
ened the Phocians, but they are not false. Demosthenes (9.12) again alludes to 
Philip’s control of Thessaly as he did in earlier speeches and mentions Phil-
ip’s attempt on Megara (Dem. 9.17-18), which may be confirmed by a passage 
in Plutarch (Phocion 15). His statement that Philip administered the Pythian 
games in 346 is accurate (Dem. 9.32 with Diod. Sic. 16.60.2), and the informa-
tion about the Athenians chasing out the pro-Macedonian Plutarchus is also 
accurate (Dem. 9.57 with Plut. Phocion 12-14). Another section (9.59-62; cf. 12, 
17, 18) contains a discussion of the situation in Euboea and states that Philis-
tides, Menippus, Socrates, Thoas and Agapaeus controlled the city of Oreus in 
Philip’s interest. All these names are not mentioned in other sources, but the 
14. Demosthenes shades the truth here because the Thracian towns were not seized 
during the peace but before the treaty was sworn. For discussion, see Harris 1995, 165-
166. Philip’s capture of these cities is however accurate. 
15. See Harris 1995, 79-80. 
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role of Philistides is confirmed by a fragment of Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 159-
160; cf. Steph. Byz. Ethnika s.v. Ὠρεός). Demosthenes’ statements about earlier 
events are also roughly accurate. He recalls the alliances between the Spartans 
and the Persians (Dem. 9.47) and the Spartan invasions of Attica during the 
Peloponnesian War (Dem. 9.48 with Thuc. 2.18-23; 2.47, 55-7; 3.1, 26; 4.2, 5-6). 
His statement about the Theban victory at Leuctra is accurate (Dem. 9. 23).16 
The figure of thirteen years for Philip’s attacks on the Greeks would place the 
start of his aggression around 354, which is debatable but not unreasonable 
(Dem. 9.25).17 Yet one needs to take the rhetorical context into account here 
because Demosthenes wishes to contrast Philip’s many crimes done in a short 
space of time with the crimes committed by the Athenians and the Spartans 
over a longer period of time.18
On the Chersonese (8) was delivered in 342/1 (Dion. Hal. Amm. 4), but large 
parts of it (Dem. 8.38-51, 52-67) are repeated in the Fourth Philippic (11-27, 55-
70). Demosthenes once more mentions the tyrants in Euboea (36), the capture 
of Olynthus by treachery (40), and the Athenian “liberation” of Euboea in 357 
(73-75). Much of the speech is devoted to a discussion of Diopeithes’ activities 
in the Chersonnese, which appears to be confirmed by evidence from the hy-
pothesis to the speech, which may draw on independent sources. 
In the Fourth Philippic (10), which was delivered in 342/1 or 341/0 (see 
Didymus col. 1.30), Demosthenes repeats much of the information found in 
earlier speeches about Serreion and Doriskos (8), Euboea (8, 9), Megara (9), 
Amphipolis (12), Potidaea (12), Thebes and Phocis (47), Olynthus (64) and 
Thrace (65), which we have found to be reliable. In one section he discuss-
es Athenian relations with the Persian king, information which is confirmed 
by other sources. Demosthenes (10-31-32) mentions the Benefactors of the 
King, whose existence is well attested,19 and alludes to the arrest of Hermias, 
16. For discussion, see Herrman 2019, 223. 
17. See Herrman 2019, 225. 
18. For a similar case of Demosthenes’ manipulation of dates, see Dem. 21.154 with 
Harris 1989, 121-125. Daix, Fernandez 2017, 403 believe that the text may have been 
corrupted, but the evidence of Plutarch Demosthenes 12 and POxy XI 1378, col. ii, 19-21 
show that the reading of the manuscripts was the reading in antiquity and that Daix 
and Fernandez are mistaken. 
19. Briant 2002, 303-304.
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which is discussed at length by Didymus (cols. 4.59-6.62), and to cooperation 
between Perinthus and the satraps of Asia Minor (Dem. 10.31-33), which is also 
confirmed by Didymus (cols. 4.1-15). In the same section Demosthenes (10.34) 
refers to the help the Persian king gave the Athenians during the Corinthian 
War and his recent offer to help them again, which is confirmed by a fragment 
of Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 157). Later in the speech, Demosthenes (10.51-
52) recalls the strategy of the Persian king in pitting the Greeks against each 
other and supporting the weaker side to keep the stronger in check, which 
is certainly a good description of the king’s tactics in the Ionian War and the 
Corinthian War.20
The speech of Hegesippus On Halonnesus ([Dem.] 7), dated to early 343, al-
ludes to many of the same incidents mentioned in Demosthenes’ speeches to 
the Assembly: Philip’s capture of Potidaea (10), his control over Amphipolis 
(23-28), and Philip’s expedition against Ambracia (32) and against Serreion 
and Ergiske (37).21 Hegesippus ([Dem.] 7.29) claims that the King of Persia rec-
ognized Athenian claims to Amphipolis, which may or may not have been true 
but was believed by Aeschines (2.32) and Demosthenes (19.283). Hegesippus 
([Dem.] 7.11) gets the name of Philip’s father Amyntas right.
There is no reason to believe that Demosthenes was more scrupulous about 
recent events than other speakers in the Assembly. In the debate at Athens in 
433 the Corcyreans do not misrepresent recent events like their naval victory 
over the Corinthians (Thuc. 1.32.5) and the offer for arbitration about Epidam-
nus (Thuc. 1.34.2). The Corinthians are also accurate in their statements about 
the siege of Epidamnus (Thuc. 1.38.5), the revolt of Samos and the Athenian 
conquest of Aegina (Thuc. 1.41.2). The Corcyreans and the Corinthians differ 
about the intepretation of one clause in the Thirty Years Peace, but they agree 
about its main terms (Thuc. 1.35.3; 40.2). Cleon and Diodotus disagree about 
the punishment for the citizens of Mytilene but they do not give different 
versions of the main facts of the revolt (Thuc. 3.37-48). The same is true about 
the debate between Nicias and Alcibiades in 415 about the expedition to Sicily 
(Thuc. 6.9-23). In the speeches given by Thucydides misrepresenting the facts 
was not considered a way of ta deonta eipein. At the debate in the Assembly in 
370/69 the Peloponnesian ambassadors do not misrepresent recent history 
20. See Thuc. 8 passim and Xen. Hell. 4 passim. 
21. For the date of Hegesippus’ speech, see Harris 1995, 169-171. 
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or the present military situation (Xen. Hell. 6.33-48; cf. 7.1.2-14). In all these 
speeches in the historians, references to recent events are also brief and to 
the point. 
A study of the use of recent events in Demosthenes’ speeches to the As-
sembly and the speeches in Thucydides and Xenophon reveals that the orator 
is generally reliable and accurate.22 What is also striking is that almost every 
mention of recents events is very brief, often only a few words and never more 
than a sentence or two. There are no lengthy narratives of past history in the 
speeches to the Assembly. 
2. Events in the fifth century BCE in On the Peace, Aeschines and other 
sources
We can now turn to the speech On the Peace attributed to Andocides. A close 
study of the information given about the situation in Greece around 391 and 
recent events reveals that the speech cannot be genuine. In a previous essay I 
compared the accounts of Athenian history in the fifth century given respec-
tively in On the False Embassy by Aeschines (2.172-177) and in On the Peace (3-9) 
and demonstrated that there were both similarities and differences between 
the two accounts, but that On the Peace contains more errors than the account 
of Aeschines.23 Rhodes does not contest this analysis and admits that there are 
more errors about Athenian history in the On the Peace than in Aeschines.24 
Rhodes however denies that this fact is evidence that the On the Peace was 
composed after Aeschines’ speech On the False Embassy. His reason for this view 
is that “Aeschines perpetuates fewer errors because of the way in which he 
is reusing the text.” This explains nothing at all. Moreover, Rhodes fails to 
discuss how Aeschines is reusing the text, his aims in reusing the material, 
22. In his study of historical allusions in the orators Pearson 1941 does not make a 
distinction between events in the distant past and the recent past or between speeches 
to the court and speeches to the Assembly. Maltagliati 2020 is a narrow rhetorical study 
of exempla, does not assess their accuracy and makes no distinction between deliber-
ative and forensic oratory. In general, one cannot argue that the discursive protocols 
of the Assembly and of the courts differed over time. On mentions of ancestors and 
liturgies, see Harris 2016. On charges of deception, see Kremmydas 2013. On the broad 
continuity in the use of arguments from justice, see Heath 1990. 
23. Harris 2000, 480-487.
24. Rhodes 2016, 183.
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and how his manner of reusing the text can be used to explain the differences 
between the two passages. Nor does Rhodes analyze the distinctive features of 
Aeschines’ text and examine its aims in their rhetorical context.
Aeschines (2.171, 177) is quite explicit about his reasons for recalling these 
events: he is attempting to justify his support for the Peace of Philocrates. His 
aim is very clear: he wants to show that the Athenians prosper more during 
time of peace than during wartime. To achieve this aim, Aeschines should be 
expected to provide as much evidence as possible and not to subtract items 
supporting his general point or to alter evidence to make it less compelling. 
Now, given his aim in this section, we should expect Aeschines to claim that 
the Athenian fleet was very large. Yet Aeschines (2.175) states that the Athe-
nians had three hundred triremes while On the Peace (9) puts the number at 
over four hundred. When we take into account Aeschines’ aims in this section, 
one would expect him to keep the larger number of over four hundred rath-
er than reduce it to three hundred. Rhodes appears to realize that this evi-
dence seriously undermines his objection and resorts to a desperate remedy: 
he claims that the text of Andocides is corrupt and follows Markland, who is 
also followed by Edwards, in emending the text of On the Peace (9) to remove 
the problem. Dilts and Murphy (2018), who have studied the manuscripts, do 
not emend the text and for good reason: there is no evidence for corruption 
and no good paleographical grounds to explain how such a corruption might 
have occurred. The speech On the Peace is preserved in two manuscripts, A 
and Q. Though A has many corrections, there is no evidence for variants in 
this passage. The difference between the figure in Aeschines and the figure 
in On the Peace cannot be emended away. What is more serious, Rhodes can-
not explain why Aeschines would have reduced the number of triremes if his 
intent in this section was to praise the benefits of peace. Aeschines (2.172) 
states that the Athenians made a treaty with the Spartans for fifty years and 
kept the treaty for thirteen years. On the Peace (3-4) adds that before this trea-
ty the Athenians held Megara, Pegai and Troizen, which Aeschines does not 
mention. If Aeschines was celebrating the advantages of peace, why did he not 
mention Athenian control over these places during peace-time? Pace Rhodes, 
one cannot use Aeschines’ manner of reusing material as a way of explaining 
this difference or any of the other differences. The objection is groundless.
On the other hand, one needs to bear in mind what we observed in the 
previous section: speakers in the Assembly do not give long accounts of past 
events but refer to them briefly and succinctly. By contrast, lengthy accounts 
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of past events occur in forensic speeches like the account of the siege of Pla-
taea in the Against Neaira of Apollodorus ([Dem.] 59.94-107), the account of 
the Athenian reaction to Philip’s victory at Chaeronea in Against Leocrates of 
Lycurgus (37-54), the account of Charidemus’ career in Against Aristocrates 
(Dem. 23.144-211), the story of the announcement of Philip’s arrival at Elateia 
and Demosthenes’ reaction in 339 (Dem. 18.169-180), and the account of Ther-
amenes’ career given by Lysias in his speech Against Eratosthenes (12.62-78). 
This makes sense: speakers in the Assembly could not make long speeches, 
but litigants in court had up to three hours in a public case.25 If therefore we 
take into account the way speakers in the Assembly use historical material, 
we would expect the account of Aeschines in On the False Embassy (2.172-77) 
to be much longer than the account of the same events in On the Peace (3-9) 
which was written for the Assembly, but we find the opposite: the account in 
the On the Peace is slightly longer in several places. The person who composed 
On the Peace was clearly not familiar with the different discursive protocols of 
the Assembly and law courts. He took what he found in Aeschines’ speech and 
added to this material but committed more errors. One finds a similar phe-
nomenon in the forged documents inserted into the speeches of the orators. 
For instance, the person who forged the decree of Demophantus at Andocides 
1.96-98 took some information from Demosthenes’ speech Against Leptines 
(20.159) and Lycurgus’ speech Against Lycurgus (124-126) and added material, 
which reveal the author’s ignorance of Athenian documents and documentary 
language.26
This is not the only place in which the author of On the Peace did not un-
derstand the difference between speeches in the Assembly and speeches in 
the lawcourts. In the latter, it was not unusual for litigants to mention their 
ancestors by name. In orations delivered in the Assembly, however, speakers 
do not as a rule mention their ancestors by name.27 In On the Peace (6, 29) we 
25. For the length of speeches in public cases, see [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 67.2-4 with Mac-
Dowell 1978, 249. 
26. See Harris 2013/2014 with a detailed refutation of Sommerstein 2014. Recently 
scholars have recognized that the evidence against the authenticity of this document 
is overwhelming; see Liddel 2020, 79 and Dilts, Murphy 2018, vi.
27. See Harris 2016. Alcibiades mentions his ancestors in his speech to the Assem-
bly in 415 (Thuc. 6.16.1–3), but he does not name any of them. The only exception to 
this rule is the practice of foreign ambassadors mentioning their ancestors as a way 
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find the names of Andocides, the grandfather of Andocides, and of Epilycus, 
the uncle of Andocides. This is without parallel in all the preserved speeches 
given in the Assembly and provides additional evidence against authenticity. 
One must also recall that if, as Rhodes believes, On the Peace was delivered 
in 391, then it is unlikely that the speech would contain major mistakes about 
relatively recent public events. In Aeschines (2.175) one reads that the Athe-
nians held Euboea during the Peace of Nicias. This is confirmed by other evi-
dence. Thucydides (1.114.3) reports that Pericles recovered all of Euboea after 
its revolt in 447/6. According to Thucydides (4.24, 43.4; 7.57.4), Carystus sent 
a contingent for the expedition of Nicias against Corinth in 425, and Eretria, 
Chalcis and Carystus sent troops for the Sicilian expedition. He later states 
(8.95.7) that all of Euboea except Oreos revolted in 411. The Assessment list 
of 425 corroborates this information (IG I3
 
71): the list includes the cities of 
Carystus (l. 70), Styra (l. 74), Chalcis (l. 71), Eretria (l. 67), the Diakrians in Eu-
boea (ll. 93-94), Dion (l. 78) and Athenai Diades (l. 79).28 But On the Peace (9) er-
roneously states that the Athenians held only two thirds of Euboea during this 
period, which was only a little over twenty years before. As we observed in the 
previous section, speakers in the Assembly do not make this kind of mistake 
about recent events.
One can add more examples of serious mistakes about recent major events. 
Toward the end of the speech, On the Peace (39) contains some outright false-
hoods about recent history. After their defeat in war, one reads that the Spar-
tans took the walls and the ships of the Athenians as security (ἐνέχυρα). The 
term ἐνέχυρα can refer to items of property either taken as security in case 
of default or items of property taken by a creditor as compensation for an 
unpaid debt or other obligation.29 The use of the term ἐνέχυρα in an account 
of building credibility, but this is not the case in On the Peace. A reader for the journal 
observes that Andocides mentions his ancestor Leogoras at 2.26 but this is not a de-
liberative speech before the Assembly but a petition on a personal matter and there-
fore unlike On the Peace and the speeches of Demosthenes. The reader also observes 
that Andocides calls Leogoras “the great-grandfather of my father” here but “my great 
grandfather” at 1.106. This may indicate that this speech is also a forgery or may be a 
scribal error. See Davies 1971, 28. 
28. The Athenians also had a cleruchy at Histiaea; see Thuc. 1.114.3; Plut. Per. 23.4; 
IG I3
 
41. For Athenian control of all of Euboea, see Meiggs 1972, 565-570. 
29. See Harris 2006, 163-240. 
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of interstate relations is without parallel. A participial phrase then explains 
what this expression means: the Spartans took the ships of the Athenians and 
destroyed (καθελόντες) their walls. The speech continues by asserting that 
the Spartan ambassadors are now in Athens “returning the securities” (τά τε 
ἐνέχυρα ἡμῖν ἀποδιδόντες) and allowing them to acquire walls and ships (τὰ 
τείχη καὶ <τὰς> ναῦς ἐῶντες κεκτῆσθαι).30 In an earlier section, On the Peace (36) 
states that, if the Athenians accept the treaty, ships and the walls will return to 
the city, which implies that the Athenians did not have them at the time. This 
contains several serious errors. First, Xenophon (Hell. 2.2.20) states that the 
Athenians surrendered all their ships except for twelve. The Athenians were 
able to rebuild their navy earlier than 391 and contributed ships to the fleet 
commanded by Conon and Pharnabazus in the victory at Cnidus in 394 (Xen. 
Hell. 4.3.10-12; cf. Diod. Sic. 14.83.4-7). Shortly after this, Conon had an Athe-
nian fleet at his disposal (Xen. Hell. 4.8.9, 12). They did not need the Spartans 
to return ships taken from them in 391 to acquire a fleet. Second, according 
to Xenophon, the Athenians were also required to tear down their walls after 
their defeat, though Lysias (13.14) says that the Athenians destroyed only the 
Long Walls and the fortifications of the Piraeus. The Athenians rebuilt their 
walls not because the Spartans permitted them to do so in 391 but because 
they were in a position to do so as early as 395/4. Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 
40) states that they began this work in that year, and this information is con-
firmed by inscriptions (SEG 19, 145; IG II2 1660). Xenophon (Hell. 4.8.9-10; cf. 
Diod. Sic. 14.85.3; Dem. 20.68, 72-74) also places the reconstruction of the walls 
at this time.31
Rhodes attempts to explain away this passage: “In 404 Sparta had the walls 
destroyed and confiscated the ships to prevent Athens from becoming power-
ful again; the walls were not literally held as security so we need not suppose 
that the ships were; by the late 390s Athens had rebuilt the walls and had 
built new ships, and τά τε ἐνέχυρα ἡμῖν ἀποδιδόντες is, rather than a literal 
claim that the ships Sparta took in 404 were taken as security and were now 
to be returned, a way of indicating that, in contrast to 404, the treaty now 
30. Edwards 1995 and MacDowell in Gagarin, MacDowell 1998, 157 do not discuss 
this statement. In Harris 2000, 497 I discussed the error about the ships, but not the 
statement about the walls. 
31. Cf. Theocharaki 2020, 27-28, who does not see how this information clashes with 
the information in On the Peace. 
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being negotiated would allow Athens to keep its (rebuilt) walls and its (new) 
ships.”32 The expression ἐνέχυρα may be an odd way of referring to the act 
of destroying the wall, but what On the Peace states about the ships is very 
clear: the Spartans took them in 404 and are now returning them. One cannot 
transform the participle ἀποδιδόντες into a “figurative” way of stating that 
the proposed terms “would allow Athens to keep (…) its (new) ships.” If the 
author wanted to express the idea of “allowing to keep”, he would not have 
used the participle ἀποδιδόντες (“giving back”) but the participle ἐῶντες. To 
make his suggestion work, Rhodes has to place words in the text (“its [rebuilt] 
walls and its [new] ships” –there is nothing corresponding to “rebuilt” and 
“new” in the Greek of the passage, words that are not in our manuscripts). 
The text plainly states that the Spartans took the ships and are now returning 
them; the wording of the passage is clear as it stands and cannot be explained 
away as “figurative”. Rhodes also fails to observe that in an earlier section (36) 
the speaker says that the Athenians will have walls and ships in the future as 
a result of the treaty (τείχη καὶ νῆες εἰ γενήσονται τῇ πόλει), which clearly 
implies that they do not have them at the present moment. In the following 
section (37) the speaker also implies that the Athenians do not have walls and 
ships right now by telling them “if you wish now too (i.e. to acquire them), 
get them for yourselves.” Earlier in On the Peace (23) the speaker says that the 
Spartans now are “are giving to us the walls and the ships and the islands to 
be ours” (διδόασιν ἡμῖν τὰ τείχη καὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰς νήσους ἡμῶν εἶναι). One 
does not give to someone else objects the recipient already possesses.33 These 
three passages rule out Rhodes’ interpretation of section 39. The proposal re-
ported by On the Peace would have made no sense at all in 391; did the Spar-
tan ambassadors really believe that the Athenians in the Assembly thought 
that they had no walls and no fleet at the time? This passage must have been 
written long after 391 by someone who knew very little about the historical 
circumstances of the period.
Let us return to the statement in On the Peace (28; cf. 32) that in 391 the 
Athenians faced a choice between joining with the Argives in a war against 
32. Rhodes 2016, 185. 
33. The translation of Edwards 1995, 123 is very misleading and inaccurate: “offer-
ing to us to keep our walls, ships and islands.” One cannot translate διδόασιν as “offer-
ing,” and there is nothing in the Greek corresponding to “to keep” in Edwards’ English 
translation. 
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Sparta and making peace with Sparta as the Boeotians have done. The speaker 
warns the Athenians not to repeat the error of supporting weak allies and 
abandoning strong ones, an error that they have made in the past. To support 
his point, the speaker adduces three examples in chronological order (29-31). 
First (πρῶτον), the Athenians made a treaty with the Great King negotiated by 
his uncle Epilycus but were persuaded by Amorges, the runaway slave of the 
Great King, to choose his friendship, which caused the Great King to side with 
the Spartans and give them five thousand talents until Athens was defeated. 
Second, when the Syracusans came to offer the Athenians their friendship, 
the Athenians chose to support the people of Egesta, which led to the defeat in 
Sicily. Third and later (ὕστερον), the Argives persuaded the Athenians to sail 
against Laconia while they were at peace with the Spartans, which led to their 
defeat in the Peloponnesian War. 
Before examining the statements about these incidents, it is important 
to note the temporal sequence. According to On the Peace, the support for 
Amorges came first (29: πρῶτον), followed by the campaign in Sicily and later 
(31: ὕστερον) the decision to side with Argos. From the narrative of Thucy-
dides, we know that the support for Amorges came in the later summer of 412 
(Thuc. 8.28.2-4), the decision to support Egesta in 415 (Thuc. 6.6-8), and the 
decision to support Argos in the summer of 414 (Thuc. 6.105). Even though 
these events took place less than twenty five years before 391, the author has 
made a serious mistake about the date of the support for Amorges.34
Let us examine the second and third events. As Rhodes, Edwards and my-
self have observed, the story of the Syracusan invitation to conclude a trea-
ty of friendship is contradicted by the narrative of Thucydides (6.6-8).35 Once 
again, On the Peace makes a serious mistake about recent history. On the other 
hand, the Athenian support for Argos and its diplomatic consequences, which 
led to a resumption of hostilities, is confirmed by Thucydides (6.105; 7.18). 
To return to the first example. Thucydides mentions Amorges in four pas-
sages. In the winter of 413/2 Tissaphernes sends an envoy to Sparta to offer 
financial assistance against the Athenians in Asia, one of his motives being to 
capture alive or kill Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, who had revolted 
(Thuc. 8.5.4-5). This passage does not indicate whether the Athenians were 
34. Westlake 1989, 108 sees the mistake but still assumes that On the Peace is a gen-
uine speech of Andocides. 
35. Rhodes 2016, 185; Edwards 1995, 199; Harris 2000, 496-497. 
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supporting Amorges at this time or not. Later, after the revolts in Asia, when 
some ships from Chios arrived, the Spartan commander Chalcideus reports 
that the ships must return home and that Amorges is about to arrive by land 
with troops (Thuc. 8.19.1-2). This passage also says nothing about Athenian 
support for Amorges. In the late summer of 412 Tissaphernes persuades the 
Peloponnesians to make an assault by sea against Iasos, which is the headquar-
ters of Amorges and his mercenaries. This attack succeeds because the ships 
are thought to be Athenian. The Peloponnesians capture Amorges alive and 
turn him over to Tissaphernes. The fact that Amorges appears to have been 
expecting Athenian help is the first indication of any relationship between 
Amorges and the Athenians (Thuc. 8.28.2-4). During the following winter Pei-
sander had Phrynichus dismissed by accusing him of betraying Amorges and 
Iasos. Thucydides (8.54.3) considers the charge false, a slander designed to re-
move an enemy of Alcibiades. There are two issues here: first, the relative 
chronology of Athenian support for Amorges and the offer of Persian support 
to Sparta (which occurred first?), and, second, the causal relationship between 
the two events (did Athenian support for Amorges cause the Persians to sup-
port Sparta?). Rhodes notes that I follow Westlake, who argues that Athenian 
support for Amorges came after Persian support for Sparta, but he does not 
examine the evidence reviewed above. Rhodes admits that Thucydides “does 
not make it clear when Athens began to support Amorges” and “does not 
give Athens’ support for Amorges as Persia’s reason for supporting Sparta”.36 
Rhodes does not list the incidents found in On the Peace in the order they are 
given in the speech and therefore fails to note the error in chronology. A little 
further on, Rhodes claims that while the statement about the Syracusan em-
bassy “probably is a mistake,” the statement about Amorges “may well not be” 
without giving a reason. If one thinks that a statement in a passage in which 
other errors are found is not an error one must present arguments to prove 
one’s point and respond to the analyses and evidence put forward by those 
who argue that the statement is an error. Rhodes supports his statement with 
nothing more than ipse dixit. 
It has been suggested that an inscription dated to the eighth prytany of 
415/4, that is, March of 415, and recording a payment to an Athenian general 
ἐν Ἐφ[- - -] (IG I2 302, line 69 = IG I3 370, line 79) was made to a general at Ephe-
sus and that “Athenian support for Amorges would be a reason for a general 
36. Rhodes 2016, 185. 
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being there”.37 As Westlake rightly noted, other explanations for the general’s 
presence at Ephesus are more likely and an Athenian expedition to support 
Amorges would have been sent to Miletus or Iasos.38
The passage about the embassy requires further scrutiny. Thucydides 
(8.5.4) states that Tissaphernes had recently been appointed “general” (στρα-
τηγός) either of “the people of the lower part (i.e. western part of the Persian 
Empire)” or “of the lower (i.e. western) areas” (τῶν κάτω). There has been 
some debate whether Tissaphernes was appointed to a military command over 
the western part of Asia Minor or as satrap or to both positions.39 Whatever his 
precise remit, the instructions he had received from the Great King (ὑπὸ βα-
σιλέως) were clear: he was in the process of collecting (ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένος) 
payments of tribute from those in the area of his command (τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ 
ἀρχῆς φόρους), which he owed (ἐπωφείλησεν) because he was unable to collect 
from the Greek cities because of the Athenians. This tribute was assessed in 
the time of Artaphernes, and the assessment continued until the lifetime of 
Herodotus even when the king could not collect the taxes.40 The passage clear-
ly indicates that the reason why Tissaphernes wanted the alliance with the 
Spartans was because he thought that he stood a better chance of collecting 
the tribute if he could damage the Athenians. The main reason for the alliance 
has nothing to do with Athenian support for Amorges. Tissaphernes wants to 
attack the Athenians because they are preventing him from accomplishing his 
task of collecting tribute, something On the Peace does not mention. The attack 
on the Athenians therefore has nothing to do with any support for Amorg-
es but with their interference with Tissaphernes’ financial obligations. This 
is a completely different explanation for the alliance with the Spartans than 
the one given in On the Peace. One should also note that Thucydides separates 
the aim of harming the Athenians from the aim of capturing Amorges, which 
suggests that the two objectives were strictly separate. If the Athenians were 
37. Wade-Gery 1958, 222-223; Andrewes 1961, 5; Lewis 1977, 86. 
38. Westlake 1989, 105-106. Westlake suggests that suspicions about the loyalty of 
Ephesus or a mission to collect tribute are more likely explanations. Thonemann 2009, 
174 with 187 n. 59 arbitrarily dismisses Westlake’s analysis without giving any reasons.
39. Military commander of western Asia Minor: Andrewes 1981, 13-16. Military 
commander and satrap: Hornblower 2008, 776-777. See these works for references to 
earlier views. 
40. See Hdt. 6.42.2 with Murray 1966.
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helping Amorges at this time, the attack on the Athenians would have been 
linked to this aim. As Westlake also observed, Thucydides elsewhere in his 
history does not give Athenian support for Amorges as one of the reasons by 
the Athenians lost the war.41 One cannot reconcile the information given by 
Thucydides and that given by On the Peace.
Yet we can go further. On the Peace (29) claims that when the Athenians sent 
help to Amorges, there was a treaty between the Athenians and the Great King 
concluded by Epilycus. On the other hand, the passage in Thucydides about 
Tissaphernes clearly implies that there was no treaty between the Athenians 
and the Persians at this time. First, the Great King could not expect his officer 
to collect tribute from territories subject to Athens if the Great King had a trea-
ty with him. Several sources indicate that there was a treaty earlier in the fifth 
century, known today as the Peace of Callias. This treaty granted the Athenians 
control of the cities in Western Asia Minor, which were members of the Delian 
League. Some scholars have questioned the reliability of the sources for this 
treaty, but recent studies have shown that the objections are groundless.42 This 
treaty imposed limits on Persian movements. The sources differ on the precise 
boundaries of these limits: Diodorus (12.4.5) states that no large ship (i.e. mil-
itary vessel) was to sail beyond Phaselis and Kyaneai and that Persian satraps 
were not to approach the sea (i.e. the Aegean) within a three days’ journey, 
while Isocrates (12.59) places the limit for ships at Phaselis and the limit an 
army at the River Halys. If these terms were still in effect, Tissaphernes would 
not have been able to collect any tribute from the Greek cities in Western Asia 
Minor. The Peace of Callias was concluded with king Artaxerxes I (Diod. Sic. 
12.4.4), who died in 424. According to Thucydides (4.50), Aristides, son of Ar-
chippus, captured at Eion a Persian named Artaphernes, who was on his way 
to Sparta from the King of Persia. Artaphernes was carrying letters in Assyrian 
characters from the King, who stated that despite several Spartan embassies, 
he could not understand what the Spartans wanted because the ambassadors 
never said the same thing and asked them to send men back with Artaphernes. 
The Athenians then sent Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus with their own 
41. Westlake 1989, 109. 
42. See especially Meiggs 1972, 487-95 and Badian 1993, 1-72 with the modifications 
of Samons 1998. Rhodes 2016, 178, n. 6 arbitrarily believes that the treaty was fabricated 
in the fourth century but does not give reasons and pays no attention to the work of 
Meiggs and Badian. 
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embassy. There they learned that Artaxerxes had recently died and returned 
home, that is, without continuing their journey to the Persian King. This is 
one of the most frustrating passages in Thucydides, but the diplomatic im-
plications of the king’s death are clear: the Peace of Callias was no longer in 
effect because the Athenians had made the treaty not with the Persian state, 
a political entity that did not exist, but with Artaxerxes, the Persian King (for 
the Persian King himself swearing the oaths, see IG II2 34, ll. 6-7: [τὰς οὔσας 
συνθῆκας] | [ἃ]ς ὤμοσεν βασιλ[εύς]). After the death of Artaxerxes, the treaty 
lapsed and to take effect anew would have to be sworn by his successor Darius. 
Now if the treaty of Epilycus was a renewal of the Peace of Callias with the 
same terms, then Tissaphernes would not have been able to collect tribute 
from the Greek cities on the coast. The fact that the Persian King expected 
Tissaphernes to collect tribute from these cities indicates that as far as he was 
concerned, there was no treaty with the Athenians at this point.43 And if Tissa-
phernes thought that he was free to harm the Athenians and make an alliance 
with their enemies the Spartans, Tissaphernes also obviously thought that 
he was not bound by the terms of any treaty with the Athenians. Now, if the 
Athenians or Tissaphernes violated a treaty concluded by Epilycus, why does 
Thucydides not say so? Thucydides is very attentive to such violations of inter-
state agreements. The entire debate in Athens about the treaty with Corcyra 
reflects a keen awareness of these potential implications of this agreement for 
the Thirty Years Peace between Athens and Sparta (Thuc. 1.31-44). Thucydides 
is also careful to record the alleged Spartan violations of the truce with Spar-
ta in 425 (4.16; 23) and lays much emphasis on the Athenian violation of the 
Peace of Nicias in 414 (6.105). The information provided by Thucydides there-
fore contradicts On the Peace not only about the reason for the Persian decision 
43. Cf. Stockton 1959, 66-67: “Either the Great King had a legal title to these reve-
nues, or he had not. If he had, the Athenians were breaking their bond by preventing 
the King’s representative from collecting them. If, however, by the Peace of Callias he 
had surrendered his title to such revenues, then we have here an open avowal by the 
King that he is no longer ready to abide by the terms of the Peace. Whichever alterna-
tive we choose, the Peace of Callias must be highly relevant, if it existed. Yet it seems 
that Thucydides is not of this mind; nor do we find Tissaphernes taking the obvious 
step of remonstrating with Athens over her obstructive attitude –he just turns to Spar-
ta.”. Stockton is arguing against the existence of the Peace of Callias, but the argument 
is directed against the alleged Peace of Epilycus as an extension of the Peace of Callias. 
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to support Sparta but also about the existence of a treaty between Athens and 
the Persian king in 412.44 It should come as no surprise that On the Peace has 
invented a treaty that never existed. If the author of this work could invent an 
embassy and an offer of friendship from Syracuse that never occurred (even 
Rhodes has to admit this) and could claim that the Athenians had no walls or 
fleet in 391, this author was quite capable of fabricating a treaty to score a 
rhetorical point. The speech On the Peace was clearly not written for delivery in 
the Athenian Assembly but for a performance in a rhetorical school sometime 
after the Classical period. 
This finding advances our understanding of relations between Athens and 
the Persian king in the fifth century. The Persians made no attempt to renew 
the peace treaty after the death of Artaxerxes on 424 because the situation 
had changed. Instead of the unchallenged power in Greece, the Athenians 
were now at war with Sparta. Even after the Peace of Nicias, the Persian king 
could bide his time and wait for an opportunity to claim his ancestral lands in 
Western Asia Minor. When he did renew these claims in 412, he was no longer 
bound by the terms of any treaty and was free to support the enemies of Ath-
ens. We also do not have to explain why Thucydides neglected to mention the 
alleged Peace of Epilycus or to state that either the Persians or the Athenians 
violated this treaty in 412.45 And there is no reason to believe that an inscrip-
tion granting proxenia to Heracleides of Clazomenae has anything to do with a 
treaty between Athens and the king of Persia negotiated by Epilycus because 
such a treaty never existed.46
44. The existence of this treaty has been accepted by many scholars including 
Meiggs 1972, 134, 135, 330; Lewis 1977, 76-77; Briant 2002, 591-592; Badian 1993, 40.
45. Pace Andrewes 1961, 5: “The most striking omission is of course that Thucydides, 
so soon after his description of the uncompleted embassy of winter 425/4, should leave 
out entirely the successful embassy and treaty of 423”.
46. This finding shows that the attempt of Rhodes 2016 to identify the treaty men-
tioned in IG I3 227 as the treaty negotiated by Epilycus is untenable. For other proposals, 
see Culasso Gastaldi 2004, 35-55, who identifies the treaty with the alliance between 
the Athenians and the King of Persia in the 390s. Rhodes 2016, 178-82 claims that even 
though there was cooperation between the Athenians and the Persians there was no 
formal treaty, but this is inaccurate. Xenophon (Hell. 4.8.24) states that the Athenians 
had the king as their friend in the late 390s, and this is the same language Xenophon 
(Hell. 4.1.32; cf. Thuc. 6.34) uses to describe the relationship between the Spartans and 
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3. Athenian negotiations with the Spartans and the Persian King and the 
exile of Andocides
On the Peace purports to have been delivered in the Athenian Assembly during 
a debate about a peace treaty with Sparta. In the speech we are told that the 
war with Sparta has been going on for four years (20: ἔτη τέσσαρα), which 
would date the speech to 391 because the war started in 395. There are two 
sets of negotiations reported in the sources for the Corinthian War, an un-
successful one in 392 and a successful one in 387, which led to what has been 
called the King’s Peace or the Peace of Antalcidas. There has been much dis-
cussion of these two sets of negotiations since the nineteenth century, but the 
scholars who have discussed these negotiations have by and large accepted 
the authenticity of On the Peace. As we have seen in the previous section, On 
the Peace makes serious mistakes about recent history, which lend crucial sup-
port to the view of Dionysius of Halicarnassus that the speech is not genuine. 
In this section, the sources for these two negotiations will be examined first. 
Next the information gleaned from these sources will be compared with the 
statements about the negotiations with Sparta found in On the Peace. Finally, 
a passage from Didymus about these negotiations, which Rhodes claims sup-
ports his view that there was a debate in Athens about a peace treaty in 391, 
will be examined. 
Xenophon (Hell. 4.8.12-16) is the only source for the first set of negotia-
tions. Word had reached the Spartans that the Athenians were using the 
Persian king’s money to rebuild their walls and to maintain their fleet. They 
therefore decided to send Antalcidas to Tiribazus, to report what the Athe-
nians were doing and to attempt to bring about peace between the Spartans 
and the Persian King. They hoped either to obtain an alliance with the Persian 
King or to stop him from supplying Conon’s fleet (Xen. Hell. 4.8.12). When the 
Athenians found out about this mission, they sent as ambassadors Conon, Her-
mogenes, Dion, Callisthenes and Callimedon. They also invited their allies to 
send ambassadors, and the Boeotians, the Corinthians and the Argives did so 
(Xen. Hell. 4.8.13). When the ambassadors met, Antalcidas proposed that the 
Spartans would renounce their claims in Asia and were willing to grant au-
tonomy to the islands and the Greek cities. He argued that if the Persian king 
agreed to these conditions, he would have no reason to continue fighting and 
the king. The proposal of Culasso Gastaldi is clearly superior to that of Rhodes for this 
and other reasons.
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to spend more money. And the Greeks would not launch a campaign against 
the Persian king (Xen. Hell. 4.8.14-15) The main Greek powers rejected the pro-
posals for different reasons. The Athenians were worried that the guarantee of 
autonomy would force them to grant independence to the islands of Lemnos, 
Imbros and Skyros. The Thebans were afraid that they would have to grant 
independence to the Boeotian cities. The Argives wished to keep control of 
Corinth. The negotiations were not successful, and the ambassadors returned 
to their cities (Xen. Hell. 4.8.15).
One should not study this passage in isolation from the events that fol-
lowed. After the negotiations failed, Tiribazus thought that it would be dan-
gerous to side openly with the Spartans unless he had the backing of the Per-
sian King. As a result, he gave money in secret to Antalcidas in the hope that 
if the Spartan fleet were stronger, the Athenians would be forced to return 
to negotiations, and arrested Conon. Tiribazus then went to see the Persian 
King to inform him about the negotiations and about Conon’s arrest (Xen. 
Hell. 4.8.16). The response of the Persian King reveals much about his attitude 
toward his relations with the Greeks. The Persian King sent Strouthas, who 
was in favor of the Athenians and hostile to the Spartans. When the Spartans 
saw that Strouthas was hostile to them and friendly to the Athenians, they 
sent Thibron to attack Strouthas in Asia. Thibron set up his base in Ephesus 
and the cities Priene, Leukophrys, and Achilleion in the Maeander valley and 
plundered the territory of the Great King (Xen. Hell. 4.8.17-19). After Thibron 
was killed, the Spartans sent Diphridas to take over his command and to con-
tinue the war against Strouthas (Xen. Hell. 4.8.21). What is clear is that the 
Persian King had no intention of making peace with the Spartans at this time. 
Nor does Xenophon mention any subsequent negotiations between the Spar-
tans and those opposing them (the Athenians, the Boeotians, the Corinthians 
and the Argives). Xenophon makes it clear that such negotiations would have 
been impossible at the time because the Spartans were in no position to force 
the Athenians to negotiate. And continued Persian support for the Athenians 
meant that they had no reason to yield to Spartan demands. Not only did war-
fare continue between the Spartans and the Persians but also between the 
Spartans on the one side and the Boeotians, the Argives and the Corinthians 
on the other side (Xen. Hell. 5.1.29-34).
This state of war continued until 387/6 when the Spartans sent Antalcidas 
to the Persian King to ask for peace. According to Diodorus (14.110.2-4) the 
Persian King agreed to make peace on the following terms: the Greek cities 
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of Asia were to be subject to him, but all the other Greeks were to enjoy au-
tonomia. If any of the Greeks did not comply, he would make war on them. 
The Athenians and the Thebans took it hard that the cities of Asia were to be 
abandoned, but because they were not in a position to fight, they yielded out 
of compulsion and agreed to accept these terms. Xenophon (Hell. 5.1.28-36) 
gives a longer and more detailed account. Antalcidas had gained control of the 
Hellespont, prevented ships sailing from the Black Sea from sailing to Athens, 
and forced them to sail to the territory of their allies. He went to the court 
of the Persian king and married the king’s daughter. The Athenians saw the 
size of the Spartan fleet and were suffering from raiders based on Aegina. The 
Argives were also willing to make peace because they knew the Spartans were 
about to attack them. Tiribazus then summoned all those who were willing to 
participate in the peace and read out the terms dictated by the Persian King: 
the cities in Asia as well as Clazomenai and Cyprus were to belong to him while 
the other Greek cities were to be autonomous except for Lemnos, Imbros and 
Scyros, which were to belong to Athens. If any of the Greeks refused to abide 
by the terms of the treaty, the king would make war on them. The Thebans 
wished to swear the oaths for all the Boeotians, but Agesilaus insisted that 
they swear to the terms imposed by the king. The Theban ambassadors replied 
that this was not in the instructions they had received. Agesilaus told them to 
return to Thebes and marched an army to Tegea. At this point, the Theban am-
bassadors returned and reported that the Thebans would allow the Boeotian 
cities to be independent. The Corinthians kept the Argive garrison in their 
city, but Agesilaus promised to attack the Corinthians and the Argives if they 
did not dismiss the garrison. The Corinthians and the Argives backed down, 
and Corinth became independent once more.
It is important to note the sequence of events in Xenophon. First, Antalci-
das went to the Persian King and received the terms he offered. Then Tiribazus 
summoned the Greeks to hear the terms of the treaty. The ambassadors then 
returned to their communities and presented the terms of the treaty, which 
each state would have voted to accept or to reject. It is clear however that 
Athens, Thebes and Argos all voted to accept the treaty. The normal procedure 
was for each state to have their officials swear the oaths to the treaty at home 
and then send ambassadors to the other side, who would also swear the oaths.
Now, if On the Peace is a genuine speech and dated to 391, the negotiations 
to which the speaker refers must have taken place after the failed negotia-
tions of 392 reported in Xenophon. But according to On the Peace (20; cf. 13) 
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the Boeotians were making peace with the Spartans and allowing the city of 
Orchomenos to be free and independent. Later in On the Peace (28; cf. 32) the 
speaker claims that the choice facing the Athenians is between making war 
on Sparta with the Argives or making peace alongside the Boeotians. This is 
contradicted by the information in Xenophon and Diodorus, who state that 
Thebes was still at war with Sparta in 387/6 and had not yet recognized the 
independence of the Boeotian cities. The situation described in On the Peace 
reflects the circumstances in 387/6 and cannot reflect the situation in 391. In 
the earlier negotiations, no promise was made to the Athenians about control 
of the islands of Lemnos, Skyros and Imbros, but according to On the Peace (14) 
the Spartans were making this promise in 391. This guarantee was not offered 
until 387/6. On the Peace (27) also states that the Argives had concluded a sep-
arate peace with the Spartans, yet advised the Athenians not to put any trust 
in the Spartans and wanted to make war against them at the same time. which 
makes little sense.
Yet Rhodes claims that “Peace appears to be concerned with a stage in the 
negotiations shortly after Xenophon’s conference of 392, at which Sparta by 
offering revised terms hoped to gain acceptance for the kind of treaty which 
had originally been rejected”.47 In support of this view, he cites a fragment 
of Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 149A) mentioned by Didymus, who reports that 
Epicrates and Andocides were sent into exile for proposing that the Athenians 
accept the peace sent down by the king. He then claims that the Athenians 
rejected the revised terms of the peace offered by Sparta.48 We will return 
to the statement of Didymus later, but it is first important to notice the ob-
stacles to Rhodes’ view of the negotiations. It is clear from the narrative of 
Xenophon that after the Athenians, Argives and Thebans rejected the propos-
al of Tiribazus, the king did not make an attempt to revive the negotiations 
with Sparta but sent Strouthas, a general who was hostile to the Spartans. If 
we follow Rhodes, the Persian king chose to continue his war with the Spar-
tans and to reject the advice of Tiribazus and to send a new proposal to the 
Greeks at the same time. This makes no sense. And if the Spartans could not 
force the Athenians, Argives and Thebans to negotiate in 392, how could they 
have forced them to negotiate shortly thereafter? According to Xenophon, 
Tiribazus knew that he could not force the Greeks to negotiate unless the 
47. Rhodes 2016, 185. 
48. Rhodes 2016, 186 (“the Assembly’s decision to reject the terms”).
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Spartans were stronger, but this was not the case, and the Persian king was 
not yet ready to lend the Spartans support. It is clear from Xenophon that 
the Spartans were able to force these three allies to negotiate in 387 because 
the Spartans had the king on their side and because the Spartan navy con-
trolled the Hellespont. Why would these three parties negotiate in 391 when 
the Spartans did not have Persian support and when the Athenian navy was 
equal to the Spartan navy? The sequence of events proposed by Rhodes makes 
no sense in historical terms. After failed negotiations, one forces one’s op-
ponents to the table when one’s position is stronger, not when it is weaker. 
Rhodes also mispresents the statements found in On the Peace by claiming that 
the speech came out of a conference in which the Spartans were proposing 
to make peace with the Boeotians. But pace Rhodes that is not what the text 
states: On the Peace (13, 20, 28, 32) states several times that the Boeotians had 
already made peace, which cannot have been true because hostilities continued 
between Thebes and Sparta until the Peace of Antalcidas in 387/6. One should 
also note that according to Xenophon, the negotiations at both times were not 
with the Boeotians, but with the Thebans. The same problem exists with the 
statements in On the Peace about the Argives. On the Peace states that the Ar-
gives made a peace treaty with Sparta, but in 387/6 there were still hostilities 
between Argos and Sparta.
Rhodes then points to a passage in the commentary of Didymus on the 
Philippics of Demosthenes (col. 7, ll. 11-28 [Harding]). It is important to present 
the text of the passage. 
[τὴν πρ]ọτέραν μ(ὲν) ἂν ο(ὖν) ἐπανόρθωσιν ἔ[νι]οί φασιν α[ὐτὸν λ]έ- 
γειν τὴν ἐπ᾽ Ἀντιαλκ[ίδου τοῦ Λ]άκ[ωνος] καταβᾶσ[α]ν ε[ἰρήν]ην, 
οὐ[κ ὀρθῶς ὅσα γο(ῦν)] ἐμοὶ δ[οκεῖ]· ταύτην γ(ὰρ) οὐ μ[όνον οὐκ 
ἐδέξαντο] Ἀθ[η]ν[αῖοι], ἀλλὰ κ(αὶ) πᾶν τοὐ[ναντίον τὰ διδόμ(εν)]᾽ 
αὐτοῖς ἀ[πε]ώσαντο, παρ’ [ἣ]ν α̣[ἰτίαν Φιλό]χορος ἀφη[γεῖ]ται αὐτοῖς 
ὀνό[μ]ασι, πρ[οθ]ε̣ὶ̣ς ἄρχοντα Φιλο[κλέ]α Ἀναφλύστιον. «Κ(αὶ) τὴν 
εἰρήν(ην) τὴν ἐπ᾽ Ἀντ[α]λκίδου κατέπ̣[ε]μψεν ὁ βασιλεύς, ἣν Ἀθη-
ναῖοι ο[ὐκ] ἐδ(έ)ξαντο δ[ι]ότι ἐγέγ[ρ]α̣πτο ἐν αὐτῆι τοὺ[ς τ(ὴν) Ἀσ]- 
ίαν οἰκοῦντ[ας] Ἕλληνας ἐν βασιλέως οἴκ[ωι π]άντας (εἶναι) [σ]υν-
νενεμημ(έν)ους. ἀλλὰ κ(αὶ) τοὺ[ς πρέσ]βεις το(ὺς) ἐν Λακεδαίμονι 
συγχωρήσα[ντας] ἐφυγάδευσαν Καλλιστράτου γράψαντος [οὐ]δ’ 
ὑπομείναντας τὴν κρίσιν, Ἐπικράτην Κ[η]φισιέα, Ἀνδοκ[ί]δ̣ην Κυδα-
θηναιέα, Κρατῖνον Σ[φ]ήττιον, Εὐβ[ο]υλίδην Ἐλευσίνιον».
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[By the] previous restoration some say he means the peace that came 
down in the time of Antialk[idas, the L]ak[onian], incorrectly, [at least 
as it] seems to me. For, not only [did] the Ath[e]n[ians not accept] that 
peace, but, entirely the opposite, they also rejected [what was being of-
fered] to them for [the reason which Philo]khoros recounts in these very 
words, after the heading “the archon (was) Philo[kle]s of Anaphly[s]- 
tos”: 
“And the King sent down the peace in the time of Ant[a]lkidas, which 
was not accepted by the Athenians because there had been written in it 
that the Greeks who inhabiting [As]ia were all (to be) accounted mem-
bers in the King’s household. Furthermore, they banished the ambassa-
dors who gave their consent in Lakedaimon, on the motion of Kallistra-
tos; and Epikrates of Kephisia, Andokides of Kydanthenaion, Kratinos 
of Sphettos, Euboulides of Eleusis did not even await the judgement/
trial”. [trans. Harding]
Rhodes notes that I join with those who reject the evidence of Didymus as mis-
taken but does not address my reasons for doing so.49 My reasons were: first, 
the proposal to end the war in 392 was made by Tiribazus and did not enjoy 
the backing of the Persian King while the proposal described by Philochorus 
was sent down by the Persian king; second, Xenophon says that the Athenians 
rejected the proposal of Tiribazus because they were concerned about losing 
Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, but Didymus says that they rejected the proposal 
because it placed the Greeks of Asia under the control of the Persian king; 
and third, because the statement of Didymus is contradicted by the evidence 
from the Panathenaicus of Aelius Aristides and the two scholia on this passage 
(see below).50 Rhodes does not reply to these points, but arbitrarily prefers to 
follow two essays by Keen, who attempts to defend the information found in 
49. For those who see correctly that the fragment of Philochorus must refer to the 
peace treaty of 387/6, see Bruce 1966, Hamilton 1979: 236-9, and Badian 1991 among 
others. These works however assume that On the Peace is a genuine work of Andocides, 
which was delivered at a meeting of the Athenian Assembly in 391. None of these au-
thors pays attention to the statement of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the evidence 
against authenticity. 
50. Harris 2000, 499. 
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Didymus.51 Rhodes presents no analysis of the evidence and simply asserts: “I 
think it more likely that Philochorus or Didymus in reporting him has used 
‘the peace associated with Antialcidas which the King sent down’ in reference 
to an earlier stage in the negotiations than that Didymus has attached a wrong 
date to the rejection of their recommendations and the condemnation of the 
envoys. The silence of Xenophon is no proof that the conference proposed by 
the On the Peace did not take place, and the failure of the On the Peace to men-
tion the proposed return to Persia of the Asiatic Greeks is not incompatible 
with the Athenian Assembly’s decision to reject the terms because of that (but 
Peace perhaps was passing over in silence a concession which Andocides and 
his colleagues had not been able to avoid making)”.52 These statements rest on 
nothing more than ipse dixit and completely ignore the situation in 392 as de-
scribed by Xenophon: the Persian king did not send down any peace in 392/1 
because he rejected the proposal of Tiribazus and chose to continue fighting 
against the Spartans. Keen also ignores this evidence, which completely un-
dermines his attempt to defend the reliability of Didymus. Rhodes then sup-
presses other evidence, which contradicts his views and those of Keen. This 
evidence consists of two scholia on a passage from the Panathenaicus of Aelius 
Aristides, who alludes to the condemnation of those who persuaded the Athe-
nians to accept a peace because they considered it contrary to their nature and 
wrong to agree to obey the King in front of the trophies of the Greeks. The first 
scholion in manuscripts A and C states that “he is alluding to Epicrates, who 
persuaded the Athenians to acccept the peace for reasons which we know.” 
This clearly must be the Peace of Antalcidas of 387/6, which the Athenians 
accepted, and not any earlier proposal for peace, which they allegedly did not 
accept. The second scholion in manuscripts B and D states: “He alludes to Epi-
crates. He says “they condemned”, that is, [they condemned] him to death.” 
This passage shows that Epicrates was still in Athens during the debate about 
the Peace of Antalcidas and therefore directly contradicts Didymus, who dates 
his condemnation to 392/1. The evidence from these two passages is compat-
ible with the evidence from Xenophon and Diodorus, who do not however 
51. Keen 1995 and Keen 1998. 
52. Rhodes 2016, 186. The same objections can be raised against the attempt of 
Harding 2006, 165-177 to defend the date given by Didymus. Harding’s analysis relies 
on the assumption that On the Peace is a genuine work of Andocides; he shows no aware-
ness of my essay published in 2000. 
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mention the condemnation of the ambassadors and their flight before exile. 
One should not argue that the decision of the Athenians to accept the treaty 
is not compatible with the condemnation of Epicrates and the other ambas-
sadors after the conclusion of the treaty. The Athenians were quite capable 
of making their ambassadors scapegoats when they were forced to agree to a 
treaty whose terms they found abhorrent. One need only cite the example of 
Philocrates, who negotiated with Philip in 346, proposed that the Athenians 
accept his term and later fled into exile after being charged by Hyperides.53 
Rhodes cannot therefore use the passage from Didymus to support his view 
that there was a discussion in Athens about a peace treaty in 392/1. Another 
problem is that if the peace proposal was sent down by the Persian king in 
392/1, why does On the Peace state that the proposals were presented by the 
Spartans and not by the Persian king? One cannot reconcile this clash between 
the comment of Didymus (even if it was not mistaken) and On the Peace. 
The mistakes in On the Peace about the political situation in 391 discussed in 
this and the previous section are not the kind of mistakes one finds in genuine 
speeches delivered in the Assembly.54 If the Athenians heard at a meeting in 
391 that the Argives and the Boeotians had made peace with Sparta and that 
the Spartans were offering to allow the Athenians to rebuild their walls and 
their fleet when they already had done so several years before, they would 
have thought him insane. These are the kinds of mistakes that we find in the 
exercises of the rhetorical schools of the Hellenistic and Roman periods.55 This 
part of our analysis has major implications for the understanding of the events 
in Greece in the late 390s. Because the fragment of Philochorus must refer to 
the Peace of Antalcidas and On the Peace is not a authentic speech with reliable 
information about Athenian policy in 391, there is no reliable evidence for a 
conference about peace held at Sparta in 391 nor for a discussion about such a 
treaty held at Athens in that year. This means that after Athens, Thebes, and 
Argos rejected the proposals of Tiribazus and the Persian king decided to con-
53. See Hyp. Eux. 29-30 and Aeschin. 2.6.
54. Several passages in On the Peace (26, 27, 32, 41) appear to imply that the union of 
Corinth and Argos had not yet been accomplished, but Xenophon (Hell. 4.4.6; cf. 4.5.1; 
4.8.15) states that this occurred in 393 or 392. On the other hand, Diodorus (14.92.1) 
appears to place the union later. For discussion, see Griffith 1950 and Kagan 1962. 
55. For an example of such an exercise, see Kremmydas 2007. For other examples, 
see [Dem.] 25 and 26 with my analysis in Harris 2018, 193-236.
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tinue the war against Sparta, there is no reason to believe that the Spartans 
attempted to revive the negotiations shortly afterwards. This certainly makes 
better sense from a historical perspective. 
4. Presbeis autokratores
In my previous essay I stated that in the sources for Greek history in the fifth 
and fourth centuries, Greek states sent presbeis autokratores in two circum-
stances: first, a defeated state would send presbeis autokratores to the victorious 
power to negotiate the terms of surrender; and, second, one state might send 
them to another state for the purpose of negotiating the revision of one or two 
specific clauses of a treaty already in existence. I also observed that in no set of 
negotiations between states did both parties send presbeis autokratores simulta-
neously.56 In all known cases in the fifth and fourth centuries, one party sent 
presbeis autokratores to another party. 
In an essay published in 2013 Magnetto questioned both of these views.57 
I am now prepared to admit that presbeis autokratores were sent in other cir-
cumstances than those I discussed in my essay of 2000. On the other hand, 
there are serious drawbacks to Magnetto’s analysis. First, she does not identi-
fy the differences between normal ambassadors and presbeis autokratores even 
though she claims that the latter constitute a distinct and different institution. 
Second, Magnetto does not observe how the term can be used in two differ-
ent situations, first, when one state sends this type of ambassador to another 
state to receive proposals, which are then brought back to be approved by the 
Assembly of the state that sent the ambassadors, and second, when one state 
approves the terms of a treaty in advance and then sends presbeis autokratores 
to another state to swear the oaths to these terms. Third, she believes that On 
the Peace is a genuine work and therefore does not see how the term presbeis 
autokratores is used in a different way from its use in the Classical period.58 This 
removes the one exception to the rule that in no set of negotiations between 
states did both states send presbeis autokratores. In this section I would also like 
56. Harris 2000, 487-495, with earlier bibliography on the subject. 
57. Magnetto 2013, cited by Rhodes 2016, 184 with n. 47. 
58. Magnetto 2013, 228, 232, 236 claims that the officials who are made autokratores 
at Argos in Thuc. 5.27.2 form an exception to my observation, but these are not am-
bassadors who are sent to another community, but officials in Argos. This passage is 
therefore irrelevant to the discussion. 
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to re-examine the institution of presbeis autokratores and show that the way 
the term is used in On the Peace is inconsistent with the way the institution 
is portrayed in other sources. The new analysis provides additional evidence 
against the authenticity of On the Peace. 
Before discussing presbeis autokratores, a few remarks are necessary about 
the normal duties of ambassadors. In the Greek city-state, ambassadors are 
given instructions about their duties. When the Athenians sent the Second 
Embassy to Philip II in early 346, the Assembly passed a decree in which it 
specified what the ambassadors were to do. This included a clause to the ef-
fect that the ambassadors were also “to do whatever good they could.” The 
meaning of this phrase led to a dispute between Aeschines and Demosthenes 
(Aeschin. 2.102-8), but neither man questioned the fact that the ambassadors 
could not do anything that was not contained in their orders. When the Sec-
ond Embassy returned to Athens, Demosthenes (19.8, 155) charged Aeschines 
with disobeying his instructions at his euthynai and repeated the charge at 
his trial in 343. In the prologue to his speech Demosthenes (19.4, 6) reminds 
the judges that one of the duties of an ambassador is to observe one’s instruc-
tions. In the same speech Demosthenes (19.278) recalls that the Athenians 
condemned Epicrates because he acted contrary to his instructions (παρὰ τὰ 
γράμματα). During the negotiations about the Peace of Antalcidas, the The-
bans sent ambassadors to Sparta to take the oaths for the treaty on behalf of 
all the Boeotians (Xen. Hell. 5.1.32). Agesilaus refused to allow them to swear 
the oaths for the Boeotians because the treaty specified that the Greek cities 
were to be autonomous. The Theban ambassadors stated that they could not 
do this because it was contrary to their instructions (οὐκ ἐπεσταλμένα). Agesi-
laus then told them to return to the Thebans and to tell them to change their 
policy. What is clear is that the ambassadors could not violate their orders and 
could not change them without returning to Thebes and receiving new orders. 
With this in mind, we can examine the uses of the term presbeis autokra-
tores. After discussing the passages in which the term appears, we will discuss 
passages in which the expression telos echontes occurs. 
1) After their defeat at Himera in 480, the Cathaginians sent presbeis auto-
kratores to negotiate with Gelon. Gelon imposed conditions, which the ambas-
sadors brought back to Carthage, and the Carthaginians accepted his terms 
(Diod. Sic. 11.24.3-4, 26.2-3). 
2) After his defeat on Cyprus, the Persian king sent a written message to 
his satraps with the terms on which they can reach a settlement with the 
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Athenians. Artabazus and Megabyzus sent ambassadors to Athens to discuss a 
settlement in 449. The Athenians send presbeis autokratores, and the Athenians 
and their allies concluded peace with the Persians (Diod. Sic. 12.4-5).
3) In the next example, the Spartans sent presbeis autokratores to the Athe-
nians in 420. During the previous year, the Athenians and the Spartans had 
concluded the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.18). A year later, the Athenians were 
angry because they believed that the Spartans had not honored their prom-
ises about Panactum and about an alliance with the Boeotians (Thuc. 5.43). 
Alcibiades tried to exploit this tension by inviting the Argives to come to Ath-
ens with representatives from Mantinea and Elis (Thuc. 5.43-44.2). To prevent 
an alliance between Athens and Argos, the Spartans reacted by sending an 
embassy and intended to exchange Pylos for Panactum and to reassure the 
Athenians about their alliance with Boeotia (Thuc. 5.44.3). When they report-
ed to the Council, the Spartan ambassadors stated that they had come with full 
powers to negotiate about all their disputes (Thuc. 5.44.3: αὐτοκράτορες... περὶ 
πάντων ξυμβῆναι τῶν διαφόρων). What is important to note is that the Spar-
tan ambassadors came with an open mandate to discuss existing disputes.59 
This frightened Alcibiades who wished to sabotage relations between Athens 
and Sparta; he therefore told the Spartan ambassadors that when reporting 
to the Assembly, if they would not say that they had come with full powers 
(ἢν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν), he would arrange the 
return of Pylos and the resolution of other disputes (Thuc. 5.45.2). When the 
Assembly met, Alcibiades double-crossed the Spartans: after they stated that 
they had not come with full powers as they had in the Council (οὐκ ἔφασαν 
ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν; cf. 5.46.1), Alcibiades denounced them 
for saying one thing in the Council and another in the Assembly. He thereby 
succeeded in making the Athenians angry and willing to conclude an alliance 
with the Argives (Thuc. 5.45.4).
In an attempt to repair relations between Athens and Sparta, Nicias per-
suaded the Athenians to send an embassy to Sparta with proposals that they 
rebuild Panactum, return it with Amphipolis and renounce their alliance 
with the Boeotians (Thuc. 5.46.1-2). The Athenians sent them with these in-
structions. When these ambassadors arrived in Sparta, they presented these 
59. Hornblower 2008, 105 does not discuss the term and relies on a very general 
statement in Cawkwell 1981, 70 n. 4 who merely states “Ambassadors could be fully 
empowered αὐτοκράτορες but only within limits, stated or understood.”
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proposals with the threat to conclude an alliance with the Argives, but the 
Spartans rejected their proposals (Thuc. 5.46.4). What is significant here is the 
difference between the remit of the Spartan embassy and that of the Athe-
nian embassy. The Spartan embassy came with an open mandate to negoti-
ate but did not present specific proposals to the Council.60 It is interesting to 
compare the account in Plutarch (Alc. 14; cf. Nic. 10.4-5), who clearly drew on 
Thucydides but elaborated on this narrative.61 Plutarch (Alc. 14.7) claims that 
Alcibiades told the Spartans to deny in the Assembly that they had come with 
full powers (κύριοι... αὐτοκράτορες) because if they did, the Athenians would 
make demands (προστάττων καὶ βιαζόμενος), which they would not do if they 
had not come with full powers. It is not clear whether Plutarch understood the 
full meaning of the term, but he saw that there was a difference between the 
two types of embassies and that Spartan ambassadors with full powers had the 
authority to receive proposals from the Athenians. 
In contrast to the Spartan embassy, the embassy of Nicias, which was not 
an embassy with full powers, made specific proposals to the Spartans, which 
the Spartans then rejected. Another important point is that Alcibiades was 
worried that if the Spartan ambassadors reported to the Assembly that they 
had come with full powers, the Athenians would have viewed them favorably, 
which would have increased the chance of a settlement. By contrast, when the 
Athenians presented proposals to the Spartans, the Spartans reacted nega-
tively. We will return to this point.
4) In 405/4 during the siege of Athens by king Agis, the Athenians sent 
several embassies to the Spartans, the last of which contained presbeis auto-
kratores. Xenophon gives a detailed narrative, which can be supplemented by 
information provided by other sources. The first embassy was sent to king 
Agis with a proposal to join the Spartan alliance in return for keeping their 
walls and the Piraeus (Xen. Hell. 2.2.11). Agis told them to go to Sparta because 
60. Gomme in Gomme, Dover, Andrews 1970, 52 does not understand the difference 
between regular ambassadors and ambassadors with full powers (“Such ‘full powers’ 
need not amount to much . . .”) but realizes that they could not commit their city to any 
conditions. Hatzfeld 1951, 91-92 thought that the Spartans had nothing new to offer, 
but this misunderstands the remit of ambassadors with full powers. 
61. Gomme in Gomme, Andrews, Dover 1970, 51 (“Plutarch elaborates part of Thu-
cydides’ narrative”). 
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he did not have the authority to make a decision (Xen. Hell. 2.2.12). When the 
ambassadors reached the border at Sellasia, the ephors heard their proposals 
and ordered them to return to Athens and send better proposals (Xen. Hell. 
2.2.13). After they returned, they reported the Spartan rejection, and the peo-
ple became despondent (Xen. Hell. 2.2.14). At a meeting of the Council, Arches-
tratus recommended that the Athenians made peace on the terms offered by 
the Spartans, one of which was to tear down the Long Walls for ten stades. 
Archestratus alludes to the proposals made by an earlier Spartan embassy and 
rejected by Cleophon, events which are reported by Lysias (13.6-8) but not by 
Xenophon. Archestratus was thrown into prison and a decree passed forbid-
ding any discussion of these terms (Xen. Hell. 2.2.12). 
At this juncture Theramenes asked to be sent as ambassador to Lysand-
er. This was a fact-finding mission aimed at discovering whether the demand 
about destroying the walls was an attempt to enslave Athens or requested as 
a pledge of good faith. According to Xenophon (Hell. 2.2.16-17) Theramenes 
stayed with him for three months and returned to Athens and reported that 
Lysander told him to go to Sparta. At this point, the Athenians sent Thera-
menes with nine others as presbeis autokratores to Sparta. Lysias (13.9-11) gives 
a different version and says that Theramenes was appointed autokrator when 
he was sent to Lysander, but seems to combine his mission to Lysander with 
his later mission to Sparta. At Sellasia, the ephors asked the Athenian ambas-
sadors what their mission was. They replied that they had come to discuss 
peace (Xen. Hell. 2.2.19). It is clear that these ambassadors were not bringing a 
set of proposals to present to the Spartans. At a meeting of the Spartan assem-
bly with representatives from Thebes and Corinth, proposals were debated, 
and finally the Spartans offered to make peace on the following terms: the 
Long Walls and the fortifications of the Piraeus are to be destroyed; all ships 
are to be surrendered except for twelve; the exiles are to be restored; and the 
Athenians are to have the same friends and enemies as the Spartans and to 
follow their leadership on land and sea (Xen. Hell. 2.2.20). Theramenes and the 
other ambassadors brought these proposals back to Athens where the Assem-
bly debated them and finally accepted the Spartan version of the treaty (Xen. 
Hell. 2.2.21-22). It is important to note the difference between the first Athe-
nian embassy, which presents Athenian proposals to the Spartans but does 
not negotiate, and the embassy with presbeis autokratores which comes with 
an open mandate to discuss peace and receives a proposal from the Spartans, 
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which is brought back to Athens. The other significant feature is that the em-
bassy with presbeis autokratores has the power to negotiate but cannot make a 
decision binding for the Athenians; the proposal they bring back to Athens has 
to be ratified in the Assembly. 
5) In the previous examples studied so far presbeis autokratores are involved 
in negotiations about a treaty and are empowered to receive proposals from 
the foreign state and bring them back for ratification. In our next example, 
presbeis autokratores are authorized to take the oaths on behalf of their own 
city after the treaty has been ratified (Xen. Hell. 5.3.26; cf. Diod. Sic. 15.23.3). In 
380/79 the Spartans besieged the Olynthians and reduced them to starvation 
because they could not collect food from their territory or import it by sea. 
This situation compelled them to send presbeis autokratores about peace. These 
ambassadors came to Sparta and made the agreement (συνθήκας ἐποιήσαντο) 
to have the same friends and enemies as the Spartans, to follow wherever they 
would lead, and to be allies. They swore the oaths to abide by these conditions 
(ὀμόσαντες ταύταις ἐμμενεῖν) and returned home. It is clear that the Olyn-
thians decided to accept the treaty before the ambassadors left for Sparta. 
The ambassadors were not empowered to discuss terms for peace, which were 
already set, but to take the oaths on behalf of their community. This is a differ-
ent use of the term for which there are several parallels in Hellenistic inscrip-
tions, which we will examine later. In the previous cases, ratification followed 
the return of the presbeis autokratores with proposals made by the other party. 
In this case ratification preceded the sending of the presbeis autokratores, who 
had a different remit. 
6) During the Theban invasion of the Peloponnese (370/69), the Spartans 
and their allies sent an embassy to Athens to ask for help (Xen. Hell. 6.5.49). Af-
ter a debate in the Assembly, the Athenians voted to send help to the Spartans 
(Xen. Hell. 6.5.49). The next year, the Spartans and their allies sent another 
embassy to Athens, this one with presbeis autokratores (Xen. Hell. 7.1.1). In this 
case, the Spartan ambassadors who come as presbeis autokratores do not come 
with specific proposals but to discuss the terms of the alliance between the 
Spartans and the Athenians (βουλευσόμενοι καθ᾽ ὅ τι ἡ συμμαχία Λακεδαιμο-
νίους καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἔσοιτο). During the debate in the Assembly, Procles from 
Phleious supported the proposal of the Council to have the Athenians hold the 
command on the sea and the Spartans to hold the command on land (Xen. Hell. 
7.1.2-11). After his speech, Cephisodorus arose and made a different proposal: 
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the Athenians and the Spartans should each hold command for five days at a 
time (Xen. Hell. 7.1.12-13). The Spartans had clearly come to discuss proposals 
because Cephisodorus asked the Spartan ambassador Timocrates to respond 
to a question about the treaty (Xen. Hell. 7.1.13-14). The Athenians then voted 
to accept this proposal (Xen. Hell. 7.1.14). In this case again, presbeis autokra-
tores come to discuss an issue about an alliance, offer no specific proposals, 
and accept a proposal made by the other side.62 Xenophon skips over the rest 
of the negotiations but implies that the Spartan ambassadors took these pro-
posals back home where they were accepted because the alliance continues.
7) In his speech Against Ctesiphon delivered in 330, Aeschines (3.63) says 
that the negotiations with Philip of Macedon began when Philocrates passed 
a decree calling for the election of ten ambassadors to travel to the king and 
to ask him to send ambassadors with full powers to Athens about peace (ὑπὲρ 
εἰρήνης). This appears to be the same decree Aeschines (2.18-19) mentions in 
his speech of 343, but in this version Aeschines says only that the decree called 
for the election of ten ambassadors who would discuss with Philip peace and 
matters of common benefit. This later version is supported by the evidence of 
the decree, which was read out. This is not the place to discuss the different 
versions given by Aeschines about the negotiations in Elaphebolion of 346.63 
To understand why he adds the detail about ambassadors with full powers in 
the later speech, we need to examine the rest of the speech given in 330. If 
the Macedonian ambassadors came in 346 as presbeis autokratores, this would 
mean that they had the power to negotiate with the Athenians, that is, to lis-
ten to proposals made by the Athenians and to discuss them. Aeschines (3.61) 
then recalls that Demosthenes passed a decree calling for two meetings of the 
Assembly, one on 18 Elaphebolion, the other on 19 Elaphebolion. Aeschines 
(3.68) recalls that after the Macedonian ambassadors arrived in Athens, Dem-
osthenes passed a decree calling for the Assembly to discuss peace and alliance 
with Philip on 18 and 19 Elaphebolion. At the first meeting, Aeschines (3.69-70) 
claims to have supported a resolution of the allies calling for peace without 
62. Pownall 1995, 145 claims that the reason for sending presbeis autokratores “would 
be to bring to a speedy conclusion negotiations in which there was little room for 
movement,” but the negotiations in this case and the case described by Aeschines (3.61) 
show that there was some room to negotiate in two cases in which presbeis autokratores 
were sent. 
63. For discussion, see Harris 1995, 70-77. 
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an alliance and with the possibility of other Greek states joining and the es-
tablishment of a synedrion to punish those violating the peace. According to 
Aeschines (3.71-72), on the next day Demosthenes arose and said that the dis-
cussion on the previous day was useless and that the Athenians could not “rip 
off” the alliance from the peace. He then called Antipater to the platform and 
asked him a question. Aeschines does not say how Antipater responded, but as 
a result of the discussion, the proposal of Philocrates was voted, which implies 
the resolution of the allies was rejected. The reason why Aeschines adds the 
detail about the Macedonian ambassadors being autokratores is that he wants 
to create the impression that there was a possibility of negotiating with them 
in 346. Had Demosthenes not coached them to give a certain answer, the reso-
lution of the allies might have been accepted instead. Once more, we see that 
ambassadors who came with full powers did not just present a fixed proposal 
but were in a position to negotiate about the terms of a treaty.
8) This example and the next are recounted in Arrian’s Anabasis. In 334/3 
when Alexander marched from Perge, presbeis autokratores from Aspendus met 
him on the road, surrendering their city to him and asking him not to impose a 
garrison (Arr. Anab. 26.2-3).64 They gained their request about the garrison, but 
Alexander ordered them to give fifty talents to his army for pay and the horses 
that they raised as tribute for the Persian king. The ambassadors agreed about 
the money and to turn over the horses. 
9) In 326/5 the leaders of the cities, the nomarchs and one hundred and 
fifty of the most distinguished men of the Oxydracae came to Alexander with 
full powers to discuss a treaty, bringing very great gifts and surrendering 
their tribe (ethnos) (Arr. Anab. 6.14.1-3). The next phrase makes it clear that 
they came as ambassadors (πρεσβευσάμενοι). Unlike ambassadors from Greek 
states, who are elected by the assembly, however, these ambassadors were 
leaders of the community and therefore had the power to negotiate. These 
leaders apologized for not approaching Alexander earlier, then requested 
freedom and autonomy. They offered to accept a satrap, pay tribute set by 
the king, and to send as many hostages as he wished. Alexander demanded 
one thousand men either to be kept as hostages or to serve in his army until 
his campaign in India was over. The Oxydracae sent the thousand hostages 
and voluntarily in addition five hundred chariots with drivers. Alexander re-
turned the hostages but kept the chariots. 
64. Bosworth 1980, 166 does not comment on the use of the term. 
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These two examples of presbeis autokratores resemble the case involving the 
Olynthians and the Spartans. In each case, the community decided to submit 
to a more powerful party and sent ambassadors who had the authority to offer 
these terms to the other party. Though Arrian, whose account is very brief, 
does not say so, both sets of presbeis autokratores sent to Alexander would have 
sworn the oaths to the treaty just as the Olynthian ambassadors did. 
10) After the defeat of the Greek forces at Crannon in 322, Antipater led 
his army to Thebes. The Athenians no longer had the support of their allies 
and held a meeting of the Assembly about what to do (Plut. Phoc. 26.1-2).65 
Even though Demades had lost his right to speak in the Assembly, the Athe-
nians granted him immunity, which allowed him to pass a decree calling for 
the Athenians to send presbeis autokratores to Antipater about peace. Phocion, 
Demades and several others were sent to negotiate with Antipater (Diod. Sic. 
18.18.2). When they met, Phocion requested that Antipater remain in Boeotia 
and not invade Attica (Plut. Phoc. 26.3). Strictly speaking this was a request and 
had nothing to do with the terms of the treaty. According to Plutarch (Phoc. 
26.3), despite the protest of Craterus, Antipater agreed to grant Phocion this 
favor, but said that as for the terms of the peace, the victors would set them. 
Diodorus (18.18.3) has a slightly different version but states that Antipater in-
sisted that if the Athenians entrust their affairs to him (τὰ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιτρέ-
ψουσιν αὐτῷ) he would not invade Attica. According to Plutarch (Phoc. 27.1), 
the ambassadors presented these proposals to the Assembly, which ratified 
them under pressure. Phocion and the ambassadors returned to Thebes where 
Antipater imposed his conditions: the Athenians would surrender Demosthe-
nes, Hyperides and their associates, return to their ancestral constitution on 
the basis of a property qualification, receive a garrison in the Munychia, and 
pay the costs of the war and a fine. Diodorus (18.18.3-4) gives a similar account 
about the ratification and the conditions. Despite the slightly different details, 
it is clear that Phocion and the other ambassadors came to Antipater with 
an open mandate to discuss terms and received those terms from Antipater, 
which were then ratified by the Assembly. The initial condition set by Antipat-
er was that the Athenians turn over their affairs to him without specifying his 
exact terms, which were given after ratification. 
65. Pownall 1995, 145 with nn. 22-23 fails to discuss this example of presbeis auto-
kratores.
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From this examination of the evidence for presbeis autokratores sever-
al points emerge. First, in contrast to regular ambassadors who come with 
instructions to present specific proposals, presbeis autokratores come with an 
open mandate and can receive proposals from the community to which they 
are sent. In several cases, the community that sends presbeis autokratores is in a 
weak position: the Athenians after their defeats by the Spartans in 405/4 and 
by Antipater in 319, the Carthaginians to Gelon in 480, the Olynthians to Spar-
ta in 379, the people of Aspendus and the people of Oxydracae to Alexander. In 
420 the Spartans were also at a slight disadvantage because the Athenians had 
the option of joining the Argives. The difference between the two types of em-
bassies is related to a major issue in diplomacy: which side will be the first to 
make proposals? Negotiations can only begin if one side takes the initiative so 
that the other can respond. A community in a weak position signals to the oth-
er party when it sends presbeis autokratores that they are willing to listen to the 
proposals of the other side and are not in a position to impose their will. This 
brings us to the second point: because only one side can take the initiative in 
negotiations, this is the reason why we never find a case in which two com-
munities send presbeis autokratores simultaneously in a bilateral negotiation. 
Either one side or the other can take the initiative, but not both. Rhodes claims 
that the fact is merely a matter of custom and not law.66 This is just not true: 
the fact that only one side could send presbeis autokratores is inherent in the 
nature of the institution. The practice was clearly shaped by Athenian consti-
tutional law, which placed the power of decision about treaties and making 
war or peace in the hands of the Assembly as Aristotle states in the Politics 
(4.11.1 1298a; cf. IG I3 105, ll. 34-35: ἄν]|[ευ τ δέμο τ Ἀθεναίον πλεθ]ύ̣ο̣[ντ]ος 
μὲ ν̣αι πόλεμον ἄρασθα̣ι̣ [μέτε καταλ]ῦ̣[σ]α[ι]). Third, after presbeis autokra-
tores receive proposals from the other side, they cannot ratify them on their 
own authority but must submit the proposals they receive to the authoritative 
body of their community; in the case of the Greek city state, the Assembly. 
Only this body has the power to conclude treaties. Fourth, because the institu-
tion of presbeis autokratores is only relevant in bilateral negotiations in which 
one side must take the initiative in making proposals, presbeis autokratores are 
never found in multilateral negotiations in which one community summons 
several other communities to conclude a general agreement. In this case, the 
66. Rhodes 2016, 184.
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leading power summons other communities to send ambassadors to their 
community, and consequently there is no need to send presbeis autokratores to 
initiate the negotiations. For this reason, one does not find presbeis autokratores 
in the discussions of the Peloponnesian League that led to the declaration of 
war against Athens and its allies in 431 (Thuc. 1.67, 119-125), the negotiations 
about the Peace of Antalcidas (Xen. Hell. 5.1.30-34), the discussions about the 
Common Peace in 367/6 (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33-40), or the formation of the League 
of Corinth (Diod. Sic. 16.89.2-3). 
Aristophanes (Lys. 1009-1012; Av. 1591-95) uses the term presbeis autokra-
tores in a similar way in two comedies. In both cases one party in a weak posi-
tion (men in Athens and Sparta, the Olympian gods) sends presbeis autokratores 
to another party in a strong position (women in Athens, the birds) with an 
open mandate to discuss terms. The stronger party then dictates terms to the 
weaker party.67
On the other hand, as we saw in the case of the Olynthians sending presbeis 
autokratores to the Spartans and in the cases of the people of Aspendus and 
the Oxydracae to Alexander, the term can be used to denote ambassadors who 
have the authority to swear the oaths to a treaty the community has already 
decided to accept.68 Normally the authorities of a community are the only ones 
who have the authority to swear the oaths to a treaty and not ambassadors 
(see, for example, Thuc. 4.119.2). In this case, the community gives ambassa-
dors powers they do not normally have. We find a similar use of the term in 
a sympoliteia agreement between Temnos and Pergamon (OGIS 265, ll. 9-10, ca. 
400). Both sides agree to the arrangement, the ambassadors elected by the 
Temnitai are “to have power” to conclude the agreement. There is another 
similar use of the term in an agreement between Pidasa and Miletus (Milet I 3, 
149, early second century), and there may be another in a fragmentary decree 
dated around 200 from Rhodes about relations with Rome (SEG 33, 637). 
Before examining the use of the term presbeis autokratores in On the Peace, 
it is necessary to examine two passages in which the expression ambassadors 
“having authority” (τέλος ἔχοντες) is found. The first is in a decree of the As-
sembly in which the Athenians invite Perdiccas II, the king of Macedon, and 
67. Cf. Harris 2000, 489-90.
68. Pownall 1995, 145 does not see the difference between the two kinds of circum-
stances in which presbeis autokratores could be sent. 
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the people of Methone to send ambassadors “having authority” (τέλος ἔχο-
ντες) to come to Athens and present their cases to the Council and Assembly if 
they cannot come to an agreement (IG I3 61). This is a case in which two sides 
send ambassadors having authority simultaneously to a third party, which 
helps them to work out an agreement. This is not a case in which one commu-
nity sends presbeis autokratores to another and then later the latter sends pres-
beis autokratores to the former. This clause does not provide a parallel to the 
situation in On the Peace, in which the Athenians send presbeis autokratores and 
then later the Spartans send presbeis autokratores to the Athenians. It therefore 
does not form an exception to the rule stated below. This case is similar to 
third party arbitration in which two sides send representatives to a third com-
munity, which helps to arbitrate the dispute. Strictly speaking, this arrange-
ment does not belong in the category of standard diplomacy between states 
negotiating about a treaty but to interstate arbitration. These ambassadors 
are therefore not similar to presbeis autokratores and do not form an exception 
to the rules stated above. 
The second occurs in the text of the one-year truce preserved by Thucy-
dides (4.118-119) in his account of the year 423. Thucydides (4.117.1-2) intro-
duces the document by stating that the Athenians and the Spartans concluded 
a truce for a year and discusses the motives of each side for making the truce. 
At the end of this discussion he states that the truce was made for the Spar-
tans and their allies (4.117.3). This clearly implies that the truce was ratified 
by the assemblies of Athens and Sparta. There follow the text of the treaty 
and the decree of the Athenians, in which the people voted to accept the truce 
with the Spartans and their allies (Thuc. 4.118.1-14). The decree of the Athe-
nian Assembly mentions ambassadors then present in Athens and votes that 
they should swear the oaths for the truce (Thuc. 4.118.14). These ambassadors 
are simply designated as πρέσβεις and not given any other title. As a separate 
measure, the Athenians vote to have the treaty start on the 14th of Elaphebo-
lion (Thuc. 4.118.12) and during that time to allow heralds and ambassadors 
go back and forth to negotiate an end to the war, which must be distinguished 
from the one-year truce (Thuc. 4.118.14). These ambassadors are also called 
πρέσβεις and given no more extensive a title. After these texts are given, Thu-
cydides (4.119.1) again states that the treaty was concluded between the two 
parties, then specifies who swore the oaths on behalf of the parties (Thuc. 
4.119.2). This was standard procedure: after each side voted to accept a treaty, 
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ambassadors were sent from one side to accept the oaths from the other side, 
and then ambassadors were sent from the latter to take the oaths from offi-
cials in the former (see e.g., Aeschin. 2.98). 
One of the terms of the treaty is a statement from the Spartans that if the 
Athenians have any better proposals about any provision, they should send 
ambassadors with authority (4.118.10: τέλος ἔχοντες). The document adds that 
the Athenians have issued the same invitation to the Spartans. This designa-
tion is different from that given to the other ambassadors in the decree of the 
Assembly. In each case it is clear that either the Athenians will send delegates 
with powers to negotiate with the Spartans or the Spartans will send delegates 
to negotiate with the Athenians. But the passage does not indicate that each 
side would send such delegates at the same time. 
Magnetto however claims that “when the truce was ratified and the oaths 
were taken, an embassy of the Spartans and their allies was present in Athens, 
and their names are listed at 119.2 as signers of the truce along with three 
Athenian generals. At 118.10 it is implied that before the embassy’s arrival, 
there had been preliminary meetings but the Athenians asked for sending am-
bassadors telos echontes for that meeting. The Peloponnesian ambassadors, as 
they themselves claim, bore that title, and request in turn that the Athenians 
also send ambassadors telos echontes for any modification of the agreement the 
Athenians would like to put into effect in the future” (my translation).69 This 
description of Thucydides’ account does not summarize the passage of Thucy-
dides accurately and misrepresents key terms. First, there is no reason to be-
lieve that those named at 4.119.2 are the same as the ambassadors mentioned 
in the decree of the Assembly at 4.118.14. In fact, Thucydides clearly differ-
entiates between the two groups because the Spartan ambassadors swear the 
oaths at Athens while the officials named at 4.119.2 swear the oath at Sparta 
69. Magnetto 2013, 227: “Nel momento in cui la tregua viene ratificata e sono 
prestati i giuaramenti, è presente in Atene una delegazione composta da Spartani e al-
leati, i cui nomi sono elencati in 119.2 come firmatari della tregua insieme a tre strate-
ghi ateniesi. Un passaggio di 118.10 lascia intendere che il loro arrivo ad Atene era 
preceduto da abboccamenti fra le parti e che, in previsione dell’incontro attuale, gli At-
eniesi avevano richiesto l’invio di ambasciatori τέλος ἔχοντες. I delegati peloponnesiaci 
presenti, come loro stessi dichiarono, portano dunque questa qualifica e richiedono a 
loro volta l’invio di ambasciatori τέλος ἔχοντες per eventuali modifiche che gli Ateniesi 
vorranno apportare in futuro agli accordi”.
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(Thuc. 4.114.1). These two groups cannot be identical. Second, the ambassa-
dors “with authority” are only mentioned at the end of the procedure. Prior 
to this, the terms of the truce were agreed by the parties though Thucydides 
does not describe the stages of the negotiations. The Spartans next sent am-
bassadors to Athens to convey to the Assembly that the Spartans and their 
allies were willing to conclude the truce and swore the oaths in Athens. They 
then brought the truce back to Sparta, where it was sworn by Spartan offi-
cials. The ambassadors with authority are mentioned only in a clause about 
future renegotiations about terms of the treaty. There is no evidence in the 
text of Thucydides to justify the claim of Magnetto that “the Peloponnesian 
ambassadors bore that title (i.e. telos echontes).” They are called presbeis and 
nothing more. This passage cannot therefore be cited as an exception to my 
observation that presbeis autokratores are sent from one state to another, but 
in no case do two states each send presbeis autokratores to the other during a 
single set of negotiations. As we observed above, the nature of the institution 
of presbeis autokratores excluded the possibility of two sides sending presbeis 
autokratores simultaneously. 
It is now time to turn to the use of the term presbeis autokratores in On the 
Peace. The term is used three times in the speech. In the first passage (6), On 
the Peace states that ten ambassadors were sent with full powers to negotiate 
with the Spartans about peace. The passage does not say enough about this 
embassy to compare this information with the other sources for the institu-
tion. Further on (33), the speaker of On the Peace states that he and his fellow 
ambassadors were sent to Sparta with full powers “so that we would not have 
to refer back” (αὐτοκράτορας γὰρ πεμφθῆναι εἰς Λακεδαίμονα διὰ ταῦθ᾽ ἵνα μὴ 
πάλιν ἐπαναφέρωμεν). Despite their powers, they have decided to grant the 
Assembly the right to discuss the terms they have brought back (πεμφθέντες 
αὐτοκράτορες ἔτι ἀποδώσομεν ὑμῖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκέψασθαι). This is complete-
ly at odds with the information about presbeis autokratores in contemporary 
sources, which show that any proposals received by such ambassadors had 
to be brought back home to be ratified in the Assembly. This was not left up 
to the discretion of the ambassadors. Finally (39), On the Peace states that the 
Spartans have sent presbeis autokratores restoring the securities and allowing 
us to acquire walls and ships and the islands. This is inconsistent with the 
practice attested in contemporary sources in four ways. First, presbeis auto-
kratores are sent to start negotiations, not once they are already underway. 
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Second, presbeis autokratores are sent by one party with an open mandate and 
receive proposals from the other party; here they are making proposals, not 
receiving them. Third, in On the Peace (33, 39) both sides send presbeis auto-
kratores, but this never happens in the sources for the Classical period and is 
inconsistent with the rationale behind the institution. Fourth, the negotia-
tions in On the Peace (24-26, 32, 34, 41) are multilateral, not bilateral; as noted 
above, presbeis autokratores are never used in multilateral negotiations where 
they would be out of place. Fifth, the speaker of On the Peace claims that the 
ambassadors had the option to ask for approval for any proposals made by the 
Spartans, implying that it was not compulsory as we know it was.70
5. The terms εἰρήνη and σπονδαί
In my previous essay I observed that On the Peace makes a distinction between 
the term εἰρήνη and the term σπονδαί and that in other passages in Greek lit-
erature the two terms are used as synonyms.71 Rhodes replies: “Harris objects 
that Peace 11 distinguishes between εἰρήνη and σπονδαί as other Greek authors 
do not. This does not worry me: Peace needs to distinguish between the terms 
imposed in 404 and the terms now under negotiation, and in order to do that 
it gives the two words distinct meanings which they do not have elsewhere, 
somewhat as Thucydides in emphasising that Athens’ alliance with Corcyra in 
433 was not a full offensive and defensive alliance but purely defensive nar-
rows the meaning of συμμαχία and distinguishes between συμμαχία and ἐπι-
μαχία as Greek writers generally do not”.72
This statement contains several serious mistakes, which completely un-
dermine the objection. Rhodes claims that the term epimachia is not general-
ly used (as distinct from summachia) in our sources, but there are important 
examples beyond the ones he cites, and this undermines his comparison. One 
finds the term in The Letter of Philip ([Dem.] 12.6), and one finds the infinitive 
ἐπιμαχεῖν with the meaning “to conclude a defensive alliance” later in Thu-
cydides (5.27.2), where this kind of alliance is implicitly contrasted with the 
full alliance. The term epimachia is found with exactly the same meaning in 
Aristotle’s Politics (1280b27: ἐπιμαχίας οὔσης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας 
70. Pownall 1995 does not see how the use of the term in On the Peace is not consis-
tent with its use in Classical sources. 
71. Harris 2000, 495. 
72. Rhodes 2016, 184. 
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μόνον). In On the Peace by contrast we find two terms, εἰρήνη and σπονδαί, 
that are used in other sources, and one of these terms, σπονδαί, is used in a 
way which is inconsistent with the way it is used in several other sources. 
Rhodes claims that On the Peace needs to make this distinction to contrast the 
two treaties, but this is fallacious: one does not have to use a term in a way 
that the audience would not have understood in order to make this point. The 
speaker could easily have made his contrast between the two treaties without 
introducing his unparalleled definition of the term σπονδαί. In On the Peace the 
speaker states that the term εἰρήνη refers to a treaty on equal terms (ἐξ ἴσου). 
By contrast, he claims that the term σπονδαί refers to a treaty dictated by the 
victors to the vanquished (οἱ κρείττους τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐξ ἐπιταγμάτων ποιοῦ-
νται) after the former prevail in war (ὅταν κρατήσωσι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον). The 
speaker gives the example of the treaty imposed by the Spartans in 405 on the 
Athenians, by which they were required to tear down their walls, surrender 
their fleet, and recall their exiles. The speaker implies that his definition is 
the one generally accepted and then provides a particular instance based on 
this standard definition. The term σπονδαί however is used in several passag-
es in which two sides make a treaty not after victory in war or when one side 
dictates terms to the other. For instance, the Peace of Nicias was concluded 
by Athens and Sparta in 421 when neither side had won a decisive victory 
over the other and is called σπονδαί (Thuc. 5.18.1 and 3, 19.1, 20.1, 22.1, 24.2). 
Neither party was surrendering to the other. The same is true of the truce of 
423 between Athens and Sparta (Thuc. 4.118.10). The Thirty Years Peace of 446 
was also concluded between Athens and Sparta when neither side had won 
a decisive victory and was able to dictate terms to the other side and is also 
called σπονδαί (Thuc. 1.35.1, 44.1, 87.2, 115.1; cf. the Five Year Treaty at Thuc. 
1.112.1). The term σπονδαί is also used for the truce for the Olympic games 
in which all the participants entered the treaty on equal terms (Thuc. 5.49; 
Aeschin. 2.133; cf. IG I3
 
6B, ll. 8, 19, 28, 38-39). What is more striking is that the 
definition of the term at On the Peace is inconsistent with the use of the term 
in other parts of the speech! This is another decisive point against the authen-
ticity of On the Peace.
6. Conclusion
The evidence against the authenticity of On the Peace is overwhelming. We can 
summarize the main points.
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1) Dionysius of Halicarnassus declared the speech a forgery, and Harpocra-
tion expresses doubts in three passages.
2) The account of Athenian history in the fifth century contains more er-
rors than the similar account found in Aeschines’ On the False Embassy (2.172-
5). Because Aeschines is celebrating the benefits of peace, we would expect 
him to make these advantages appear more impressive if he were drawing 
from On the Peace, but the opposite is true. 
3) On the Peace states that the Athenians held only two thirds of Euboea, 
when contemporary sources show that they held the entire island until 411. 
4) Speakers addressing the Assembly do not mention the names of their 
ancestors, but in On the Peace we find the names of Andocides’ grandfather and 
uncle. 
5) On the Peace states that the Athenians did not have walls or a fleet in 391, 
but contemporary sources show that they possessed both at the time. 
6) In speeches addressed to the Assembly one does not find lengthy ac-
counts of historical events, which are alluded to briefly. On the Peace contains 
a lengthy account of past events that has no parallel in other speeches to the 
Assembly. 
7) On the Peace states that in 391 the Boeotians made peace with the Spar-
tans, but contemporary sources indicate that they remained at war with the 
Spartans until 387/6. 
8) On the Peace states that the Syracusans offered the Athenians an alliance 
in 415, but this is contradicted by the narrative of Thucydides.
9) On the Peace claims that the Persian King sided with the Spartans in 412 
because the Athenians had supported Amorges, but Thucydides gives very dif-
ferent reasons for the alliance.
10) On the Peace states that there was a peace treaty between the Great King 
and the Athenians negotiated by Epilycus, but Thucydides does not indicate 
the existence of any such treaty in 412, and his account implies that no such 
treaty existed at the time.
11) It is highly unlikely that after rejecting the proposals of Tiribazus in 
392 the Athenians, the Thebans and the Argives would have entered into ne-
gotiations with the Spartans when there was even less reason to do so in 391. It 
is also hard to believe that if a major conference was held at Sparta, Xenophon 
would have omitted it in his account of the Corinthian War. 
12) The Greeks sent presbeis autokratores in two situations, either to open 
negotiations with another power or to swear the oaths to a treaty whose terms 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 10/12/2021 09:32:07 |
[Andocides] On the Peace
63
they had accepted. In the former case, the proposals brought back from the 
other state had to be ratified in the Assembly. This kind of ambassadors were 
never sent by both sides simultaneously and never sent in multilateral nego-
tiations. On the Peace has presbeis autokratores sent by two sides in multilateral 
negotiations and implies that the proposals they bring back do not have to be 
ratified by the Assembly. 
13) On the Peace uses the term spondai in a way that it is never used in sourc-
es from the Classical period. 
Once we recognize that On the Peace is a forgery composed after the Classi-
cal period, we can improve our understanding of Athenian history in the late 
fifth and early fourth centuries. First, there is no longer any reason to believe 
that there was a Peace of Epilycus between the Great King and the Athenians 
between 424 and 412 or that the Persian King decided to conclude an alliance 
with the Spartans because of Athenian support for Amorges. Second, we no 
longer have to explain why Thucydides omits the alleged Peace of Epilycus 
because this treaty never existed. Third, there is no reason to believe that 
the treaty mentioned in IG I3 227 is the so-called Peace of Epilycus; this treaty 
should be the alliance between the Athenians and the Persian King in the late 
390s. Fourth, there is no evidence for a conference at Sparta in 391 convened 
to discuss peace after the failure of the proposals of Tiribazus. Fifth, we can 
now be certain that the trials and exile of Andocides and his fellow ambassa-
dors took place in 387/6 or later. Speeches delivered to the Athenian Assembly 
had to contain reliable information about major aspects of recent events and 
about the contemporary situation. Any speech that did not contain reliable in-
formation about major aspects of recent events could not have been a genuine 




73. I would like to thank Alberto Esu and David Lewis for reading over drafts of this 
essay. Some of the suggestions made by the readers for the journal have been helpful. 
I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Paschalis Paschidis, who read the entire essay 
very carefully and made many valuable suggestions, which have improved this essay. 




This paper begins by demonstrating that speakers in the Assembly did not 
misrepresent major events in recent history. An examination of Demosthe-
nes’ speeches to the Assembly shows that his statements about recent events 
are accurate but are usually brief. This is true for speeches to the Assembly 
found in Thucydides and Xennophon. The main part of the essay shows that 
the speech On the Peace attributed to Andocides makes major mistakes about 
recent events (such as the walls and fleet of Athens, peace between the Boeo-
tians and the Spartans, Athenian control over Euboea, peace with Persia, etc.). 
The speech also does not conform to the rhetorical conventions of the As-
sembly (naming one’s ancestors, giving lengthy accounts of past events), con-
tains statements about presbeis autokratores which are inconsistent with the 
evidence for this institution in Classical Greece and uses the term spondai in a 
way unparalleled in classical sources. All this evidence shows that the speech 
is not a genuine work of Andocides but a forgery composed in the Hellenistic 
or Roman period. 
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